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Hanlon: Indian Water Rights

A NON-INDIAN ENTITY IS POLLUTING INDIAN
WATERS: "WATER" YOUR RIGHTS TO THE
WATERS, AND "WATER" YA GONNA DO ABOUT IT?
Sean M. Hanlon*

The permanent loss of [a natural resource] irreparably [tears] at the
balance of the world.'
We refer to the earth and sky as Mother Earth and Father Sky.
These are not catchy titles; they represent our understanding of our
place. The earth and sky are our relatives. Nature communicates
with us through the wind and the water and the whispering pines.
Our traditional prayers include prayers for the plants, the animals,
the water and the trees ....
Just like our natural mother, our
Mother Earth provides for us. It is not wrong to accept the things
we need from the earth. It is wrong to treat the earth with disrespect. It is wrong if we fail to protect and defend the earth. It would
be wrong for us to rob our natural mother of her valuable jewelry
and to go away and leave her to care of herself. It is just as wrong
for us to rob Mother Earth of what is valuable and leave her unpro2
tected and defenseless.

I. INTRODUCTION
Water is one of our most vital resources. Though often taken

for granted by those for whom it is readily accessible, 3 water is a
"limited natural resource and public good fundamental for life and
health."4 Unfortunately, water is constantly being threatened by
pollution and the expanding human population. As water pollution increases, the demand for energy and food also rises. 5 It is
* J.D., University of Tulsa College of Law, highest honors, 2006; Associate at Holland & Hart
LLP in Denver, Colorado. The author would like to thank his family and friends for all of their support.
Special thanks are extended to Professor Melissa Tatum for her guidance. The author dedicates this
article to his wife Karla, daughter Emma, and son Jacob.
1. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The
Role of Ethics, Economics, and TraditionalEcological Knowledge, 21 Vt. L. Rev. 225, 282
(1996) (quoting Annie L. Booth & Harvey M. Jacobs, Ties that Bind: Native American Beliefs as a Foundation for Environmental Consciousness, 12 Envtl. Ethics 27, 38 (1990)).
2. Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 225,
233-34 (1989).
3. Peter H. Gleick, The World's Water 2004-2005: The Biennial Report on Freshwater
Resources 213 (Island Press 2004) (discussing that "over one billion persons lack access to a
basic water supply, while several billion do not have access to adequate sanitation, which is
the primary cause of water contamination and diseases linked to water").
4. Id.
5. Id. at xiii.
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estimated that the earth contains a sufficient amount of fresh
water "to reliably provide food for 14 billion vegetarians, but given
current diets and water-use patterns, we have only enough water
to sustainably feed 5 billion. Our population already exceeds 6
billion."6 As the human population grows with each passing year,
the amount of water available to each person diminishes, causing
the world to demand additional nourishment in the form of
water. 7 The human population attempts to satisfy this demand
through "pumping more water from underground sources than
will be replenished by rain, snow melt, and seepage in the year
ahead. Globally, the deficit may be as high as 20 percent year
after year."8 The resulting environmental impacts that cause our
9
water supply to reach "ecological and economical limits" raise not
only moral issues, but survival issues as well.
Why is there seemingly such reckless disregard for this natural resource? One answer stems from the American capitalist economic system and the corresponding desire shared by many American individuals and businesses: the maximization of profits by
whatever means necessary. Oft characterized by its obsession
with making money, the American capitalist economic system
does have certain benefits. 10 Economic and technological advancements, for example, are fostered through free-market competition and entrepreneurial creativity.' 1 But the intoxicating demany business decisire to maximize profits blurs the reality that
12
devastation.
environmental
in
sions result
The United States poultry industry exemplifies a "profit over
environmental consequences" 1 3 mindset. "The U.S. poultry indus6. Id.
7. Id. at xiii, 313 (explaining from 1900 to 2000, the population of the United States
experienced nearly a four-fold increase, from 76 million to 281 million; however, the
amount of water on the earth is static).
8. Id. at xiii.
9. Gleick, supra n. 3, at xiv.
10. Basil Enwegbara, Saving American Capitalism, 122 The Tech '19 5, 6, 8 (Aug. 7,
2002) (available at http://www-tech.mit.eduN122/N30/col3Obasil.30c.html).
11. Id.
12. See Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Crimes Against Nature 11 (HarperCollins 2004) (discussing the 3,000 acre ExxonMobil facility, which is the world's largest oil refinery. This
facility "generates enough wealth for its owners to make the Texas economy bigger than
the gross domestic product of most nations." At the facility, "flares rumble, the ground
shakes, the air hisses. Plumes of black smoke belch upward and acrid odors permeate the
atmosphere. The smell of money, some call it.").
13. See Louise Gray, Shell's Profits Hit Record £25,000 a Minute, Scotsman 4 (Feb. 3,
2006) (referring to the concept as "profits of pollution": "Roger Higman, of Friends of the
Earth, called for the profit to be reinvested in renewables. 'It's outrageous. These are the
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try is one of the largest and fastest growing livestock production
systems in the world, growing at an annual rate of five percent." 14
The large quantities of waste and nutrients (like nitrogen and
phosphorous) generated by the poultry industry's size and "geographically concentrated nature" have resulted in "complex and
challenging environmental problems."'1 5 In 1996, for example, the
United States produced nearly 15.2 billion pounds of broiler litter,
or "enough to cover a two-lane highway 3 feet deep for 1,619 miles
or the distance from New Orleans, Louisiana to Chicago, Illinois
and on to Fargo, North Dakota." 16 Vast amounts of concentrated
animal manure and other animal waste coming from the livestock
production industry's fewer but larger operations are polluting
17
our nation's waters.
Federal, state, and tribal governments face a common challenge of protecting the waters under their care and jurisdiction.
The State of Oklahoma has already brought suit against the poultry industry to protect its waters.' 8 Likewise, Indian tribes and
the federal government must do everything within their powers to
protect the reservations' water supplies from degradation and
loss. What are the tribes' options?
A State's claim against non-Indian polluters does not preclude
tribes located within that State from seeking a similar but separate claim for redress. Inherent tribal sovereignty and Supreme
Court jurisprudence arm tribes with civil jurisdiction to pursue
legal remedies against a non-Indian entity whose activities have
polluted the waters of the reservation. 19 The impairment of
tribes' water supplies satisfies the "direct effect[s]" test from Montana v. U.S.,20 which allows tribes to exert civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian fee lands when non-Indians are engaged in activities that threaten or directly affect the
political integrity, the economic stability, or the health and welprofits of pollution and it's a tragedy that we live in an age that rewards pollution .....
(emphasis added)).
14. Manjula Guru, The Case for Acceptable Levels of Environmental Self-Regulation in
the Poultry Industry: Policy and Economic Implications 1 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
U. Ark., 2004) (copy on file with Montana Law Review).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 3 (explaining that "[b]roiler litter consists of bedding (wooden shavings, rice
hulls, peanut hulls, etc.), manure, and feed spilled by the birds onto the floor of the house").
17. Infra nn. 40-45.
18. Infra nn. 48-63 and accompanying text.
19. Infra pt. IV.A-B and accompanying notes.
20. Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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fare of the tribe. 21 Furthermore, a tribe's civil jurisdiction in this
scenario is underscored if the tribes have obtained treatment-as22
states (TAS) status under the Clean Water Act (CWA).
This article discusses the water rights available to Indian
tribes and their reservations, and addresses what actions tribes
may take to protect those water rights. Part II of this article begins with a look back at the differing cultures and philosophies
between American Indians and early white settlers. This background sheds some light on why some industries today profit from
pollution, and why the State of Oklahoma filed a federal lawsuit
against a polluting industry to protect its waters. Part III provides the necessary background on general water rights in the
United States before presenting an overview of reserved Indian
rights to water. This overview includes a discussion of whether
reserved Indian rights to water include rights to groundwater and
water quality. Part IV examines Indian tribes' jurisdiction over
non-Indian polluters: do tribes possess civil jurisdiction that is
separate from but equal to that of the States? Finally, Part V of
the article synthesizes Parts III and IV to demonstrate the ability
of the tribes to protect their most vital natural resource.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF OUR POLLUTION, AND OKLAHOMA'S STAND
AGAINST POLLUTERS

To help shed light on the "profit over environmental consequences" frame of mind, it is useful to take a historical look into
the cultural and philosophical differences between Indians and
the European settlers they encountered. Commentators have
compared the differing economic philosophies evidenced by Indians on one hand, and European settlers on the other, in the late
eighteenth century and into the nineteenth century. In the "gift
economy" attributed to the Indians, 23 "one attained social position
not by accumulation of wealth but through the size of one's
21. Id. at 566; infra pt. IV.B.1 and accompanying notes.
22. Infra pt. IV.B.2 and accompanying notes.
23. See Judith V. Royster & Michael C. Blumm, Native American Natural Resources
Law: Cases and Materials5 (Carolina Academic Press 2002) (referring to Indians located in
the Northwest prior to white settlement); see generally Heather Francis, Native American
Culture of Giving 1 (unpublished masters thesis, Grand Valley St. U., 2005) (available at
http://www.learningtogive.org/papers/index.asp?bpid=255); Native Americans in Philanthropy, About, Mission & History, http://www.nativephilanthropy.org/mission.html (accessed Aug. 31, 2007) ("Native Americans in Philanthropy celebrates the rich history that
Native peoples have in sharing their wealth and caring for their communities.").
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gifts." 2 4 In Indian society, gifts served "as the basic source of exchange and commerce." 25 Indians believed natural resources to be
inhabited by conscious spirits, making them gifts to be respected
and shared with others, not held as exclusive possessions. 26 Because the natural world was full of these spirits, humans needed
to afford them the proper respect so natural resources would continue in abundance. 27 The spiritual and cultural reverence toward these natural resources served to control any overuse or mis28
treatment.
Conversely, the white settlers generally operated under a
"market economy" which treated natural resources as "commodities to be captured and sold for profit."2 9 These profits resulted
30
from the "demand of distant markets, not local subsistence."
While the Indians understood the meaning and value of sustainability and living in harmony with the world around them, the
white settlers were much more interested in short-term wealth. 3 1
As a result, long-term sustainable use of natural resources was
certainly not their focus, and may have been disregarded alto32
gether during their quest for profits.
This difference in cultural philosophies is still largely evident
today. Many indigenous cultures believe that "reciprocity and balance are required from both sides in the relationships between
humans and other living things."3 3 Some Americans live consistently with this indigenous belief, adhering to "Teddy Roosevelt's
precept: 'The nation behaves well if it treats the natural resources
as assets which it must turn over to the next generation increased,
and not impaired, in value.' ",34 For other American individuals
and businesses, however, the "Euro-American values stemming
from Christianity, capitalism, and technology promote a view of
24. Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 5 (explaining the gift economy of the "pre-white
settlement Northwest ...

had evolved over 1,500 years").

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 5.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 5, 14 (explaining "the concept of sustainable development encourages a rate of
consumption that will ensure a constant supply of resources").
33. Rebecca Tsosie, supra n. 1, at 282 (quoting Christopher Vecsey, Prologue, Handbook of American Indian Religious Freedom 21 (Christopher Vecsey ed., 1991)).
34. Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism 52 (Outlook Co. 1910).
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nature as a commodity, as wilderness to be tamed, and as a non35
living collection of natural resources to be exploited."
The market economy focus of profit over environmental consequences is clearly demonstrated in agricultural operations designated as animal feeding operations (AFOs) and concentrated
animal feeding operations (CAFOs). 36 "AFOs congregate animals,
feed, manure and urine, dead animals, and production operations
on a small land area."3 7 It is estimated that the United States has
450,000 AFOs, with a relatively smaller number of AFOs qualifying under the heightened definition of a CAFO. 38 Over the last
twenty years, the livestock industry has witnessed a "trend toward fewer but larger operations, coupled with emphasis on more
39
intense production and specialization."
This trend has resulted in some areas becoming highly concentrated with animal manure and other animal waste. 40 This
concentration of waste is polluting the waters due to "the runoff of
nutrients in the discharges from these facilities."4 1 The runoff of
nutrients from the manure and wastewater has "the potential to
contribute pollutants such as nitrogen and phosphorous, organic
matter, sediments, pathogens, heavy metals, hormones, antibiotics, and ammonia to the environment." 4 2 The excess of nutrients
"contribute[s] to low levels of dissolved oxygen (anoxia), eutrophi35. Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 12 (internal quotations omitted) (discussing that
while "European traditions may speak of the need to maintain a balance in nature, these
traditions do not suggest that humans are in a kinship relation with animals, or that
humans owe a duty to animals").
36. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1) (2006) (defining "Animal feeding operation" as a "lot or facility (other than an aquatic animal production facility) where the following conditions are
met: (i) Animals (other than aquatic animals) have been, are, or will be stabled or confined
and fed or maintained for a total of 45 days or more in any 12-month period, and (ii) Crops,
vegetation, forage growth, or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the normal growing season over any portion of the lot or facility"); Id. at § 122.23(b)-(c) (defining "concentrated animal feeding operation" as an agricultural operation that meets the definition for
AFO and further satisfies one of the CAFO definitions); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act ("Clean Water Act"), Id. at 122.23(a), (b)(2) (determining designated CAFOs to be a
point source and subjecting the CAFO to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permitting requirements).
37. EPA, National Pollutant DischargeElimination System (NPDES),Animal Feeding
OperationsFrequentlyAsked Questions, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/faqs.cfm?program-id=7
(accessed Mar. 21, 2008) [hereinafter NPDES FAQ].
38. Id.
39. EPA, Fact Sheet: NPDES Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines
for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/
cafo short-factsheet.pdf (accessed Mar. 21, 2008) [hereinafter EPA Fact Sheet].
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. NPDES FAQ, supra n. 37.
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cation, and toxic algal blooms." 4 3 The dangers include, among
others, fish kills, food safety concerns, 4 4 and the impairment of
drinking water, rendering it threatening to human health. 4 5 As a
result, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
is attempting to strengthen the existing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) requirements to "ensur[e] effective manure management by large operations, including land
application." 46 Adherence to a strengthened system of rules "will
protect America's waters ... [by] preventing billions of pounds of
47
pollutants from entering America's waters every year."
A.

Oklahoma's Lawsuit against the Poultry Industry

On August 19, 2005, W. A. Drew Edmondson, in his capacity
as Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, and the Oklahoma
Secretary of the Environment, C. Miles Tolbert, in his capacity as
the Trustee for Natural Resources for the State of Oklahoma
under CERCLA, 48 filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of the State of
Oklahoma against several poultry industry companies. 49 The
lawsuit was initiated to protect Oklahoma's waters against the
pollution caused by the "millions of chickens and turkeys, owned
by the . . .Defendants [that are] raised annually on hundreds of
50
farms throughout the Illinois River Watershed (the 'IRW')."
43. Id. Eutrophication is "the accelerated 'aging' of waters caused by excessive nutrient
loading which causes excessive plant growth, fish kills and reduced aesthetic quality."
EPA, ConcentratedAnimal Feeding Operations (CAFO) Rule Information Sheet 2, http:/!
www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/cafo-themes.pdf (accessed Mar. 21, 2008) [hereinafter CAFO
Rule Info Sheet].
44. See Sabin Russell, Spinach E. Coli Linked to Cattle: Manure on PastureHad Same
Strain as Bacteria in Outbreak, S.F. Chron. Al (Oct. 13, 2006) (linking the recent spinach
recall due to E. coli contamination to manure waste from a cattle farm. As of October 2006,
the E. coli contamination killed three people and sickened over 200 others.); see also Dan
Vergano, Source of Outbreak No Easily Solved Mystery, USA Today 4A (Sept. 25, 2006)
(stating that "[t]ypically in outbreaks ... contaminated cattle manure is used as fertilizer,
or irrigation water fouled with runoff from dairy farms is sprayed on a field. 'Once introduced into soil or seedlings, via irrigation water or compost, E. coli 0157:H7 can contaminate the soil and vegetables grown in it for months.'" (quoting Douglas Powell, food safety
expert, Kan. St. U.)).
45. NPDES FAQ, supra n. 37.
46. CAFO Rule Info Sheet, supra n. 43.
47. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (2006) (CERCLA refers to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act.).
49. Pl.'s 1st Amend. Compl. at 1, 36, Okla. ex rel. Edmonson v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (N.D.
Okla. Aug. 19, 2005) (initial complaint filed in June, 2005).
50. Id. at 2. The Illinois Water Rivershed includes "the Illinois River, as well as its
major tributaries, the Baron (a/k/a Barren) Fork River, the Caney Creek and the Flint
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These farms produce a staggering amount of poultry waste each
year. 5 1 The State of Oklahoma contends that Defendants are legally responsible for the contamination and degradation of the
State's waters emanating from this accumulation of poultry
waste.5 2 The State will have the burden to prove that it has been
"the Defendants' practice to store and dispose of this waste on
lands within the IRW-a practice that has caused injury to the
53
IRW, including the biota, lands, waters, and sediments therein."
The remedies sought by Oklahoma against the Defendants as a
result of its practices include "abatement of these practices, expenses for assessing the injury and damage to the IRW . . . .
remediation of the injury to the IRW . . . , damages for the lost
value and restoration of the natural resources of the IRW caused
by these practices, and equitable relief."54 The sovereign State of
Oklahoma is pursuing these claims due to its "interest in the beds
of navigable rivers to their high water mark, as well as all waters
running in definite streams." 55 Furthermore, "the State of
Oklahoma holds all natural resources . . . within the political
boundaries of Oklahoma in trust on behalf and for the benefit of
56
the public."
Interestingly, Arkansas has twice attempted to intervene in
the lawsuit by motion to the United States Supreme Court. 5 7 On
February 21, 2006, the United States Supreme Court denied Arkansas' first attempt to intervene. 58 Despite this ruling, Arkansas
attempted to intervene again on May 2, 2006, when Arkansas Attorney General Mike Beebe requested the federal court dismiss
Creek." Id. at 10. "The Illinois River feeds into the 12,900-acre Tenkiller Ferry Lake,
which has been described as the emerald jewel in Oklahoma's crown of lakes." Id. (internal
quotations omitted). "Additionally, the waters of the IRW have been used, and are used,
and may in the future be used as a source of drinking water." Id. at 11.
51. Id. at 2. "These 'poultry growing operations' result in the generation of hundreds of
thousands of tons of poultry waste for which the ... Defendants are legally responsible."
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Pl.'s 1st Amend. Compl. at 3, Okla. ex rel. Edmonson v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (N.D.
Okla. Aug. 19, 2005).
56. Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added) (this author notes the political boundaries of the State
of Oklahoma may not include the Indian reservations located therein).
57. Curtis Killman, Arkansas Again Seeks Role in Lawsuit, Tulsa World A9 (May 3,
2006) (explaining that the State of Arkansas believes the case to be "an unconstitutional
and misconceived effort." Oklahoma Attorney General Drew Edmondson characterized Arkansas' request as a "blatant request to curry favor with the powerful Arkansas poultry
industry.").
58. Ark. v. Okla., 546 U.S. 1156 (2006).
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the lawsuit and order Oklahoma to mediate its case with the poultry industry. 59 Former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee 60 believes that Edmondson has "unfairly demonized" Arkansas. 6 1 If
the issue between Oklahoma and the poultry industry "continue[d] to 'escalate,' " Huckabee, while acting as Governor, publicly divulged an option for Arkansas to consider. 62 Huckabee
stated that "[tihe option, as crazy as it is, we could dam up the
Illinois River on the Arkansas side.... You won't have any dirty
water, but you won't have any water. We'll just divert it. We can
live with it. Can Oklahoma live without any of it?"63
B.

Indian Tribes Located within Oklahoma State Lines

The State of Oklahoma was established in 1907. Prior to
that, the land now referred to as Oklahoma was Indian Territory.
Today, the State of Oklahoma is home to thirty-nine federally recognized Indian tribes 64 and their Indian country. 65 The road to
Indian Territory, however, was a rocky one. The settlers' continued westward expansion and domination over the Indians forced
many to Indian Territory. During the period of 1820 to 1850, "all
but a few remnants of tribes east of the Mississippi were moved to
the West under a program that was voluntary in name and coerced in fact. '6 6 These journeys were fraught with misery and
hardship. 6 7 The "Trail of Tears," for example, refers to the journey of the Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek,
59. Killman, supra n. 57, at A9.
60. Mike Huckabee was considering a 2008 presidential bid by October of 2006. Curtis
Killman, Arkansas Governor Rips AG over Suit, Tulsa World Al (Oct. 12, 2006). Huckabee
was a 2008 Presidential candidate for the Republican party until dropping out of the race
on March 4, 2008 after Senator John McCain clinched the party's nomination. Associated
Press, Huckabee Drops out of PresidentialRace, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23473706/
(accessed Mar. 23, 2008).
61. Killman, supra n. 60. at Al.
62. Id. at A5.
63. Id.
64. 67 Fed. Reg. 46328, 46328-331 (July 12, 2002).
65. The U.S. Code defines Indian Country as follows:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original
or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
66. William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell 18 (4th ed., West 2004).
67. Id.
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Chickasaw and Seminole) from the Southeast to what would become the State of Oklahoma. 68 During this journey, over 4,000 of
15,000 Cherokee migrants died of hunger, disease, and exhaustion. 69
Moreover, the General Allotment Act of 1887 (the "Dawes"
Act), "authorized the President to allot portions of reservation
land to individual Indians." 70 During the allotment era, 90 million acres of Indian lands were taken away. 71 The lands now
owned by the Indians were largely considered to be valueless by
the settlers, and nearly one-half of the Indian-held lands were desert or semi-desert. 72 In order to succeed with an agrarian way of
life, it was and continues to be imperative for Indians to have access to water resources of a sufficient quantity and quality. As a
result, not only is it of supreme importance to Indian tribes to protect their waters, but the federal government through its trust relationship with the tribes 73 is also morally and legally obligated to
ensure that Indian water resources are not squandered.
III.

INDIAN WATER RIGHTS

Because federally reserved Indian rights to water are difficult
to understand without first understanding the basic water rights
schemes utilized in the United States, a basic summary of riparian and appropriative rights is necessary. Next, an explanation of
the landmark cases of Winters v. U.S. 74 and Arizona v. Califor-

nia 75 will provide the foundation for the doctrine of reserved Indian rights to water, or what is now simply referred to as "Winters
68. Id.
69. PBS, The Trail of Tears, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4h1567.html (accessed
Mar. 21, 2008).
70. Canby, supra n. 66, at 21.
71. Id. at 22 ("Indian held land [went] from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million in
1934.").
72. Id.; Ariz. v. Calif., 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963) [hereinafter Ariz. 1] ("It can be said
without overstatement that when the Indians were put on these reservations they were not
considered to be located in the most desirable area of the Nation.").
73. Canby, supra n. 66, at 34 (describing the relationship between the federal government and the tribes: "At its broadest, the relationship includes the mixture of legal duties,
moral obligations, understandings and expectancies that have arisen from the entire
course of dealing between the federal government and the tribes. In its narrowest and
most concrete sense, the relationship approximates that of trustee and beneficiary, with the
trustee (the United States) subject in some degree to legally enforceable responsibilities."
(emphasis added)).
74. Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
75. Ariz. 1, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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rights" or the "Winters doctrine."7 6 Then, some peripheral and
controversial aspects of Winters rights will be explored, including
whether Winters rights include groundwater and a right to water
quality.
A.

Main Systems of Water Rights in the United States

In order to gain a full understanding of Indian rights to water
resources, a basic understanding of the two major systems of
water rights in the United States is necessary. 77 These two systems developed based on the historical demand, use, and availability of water and "govern the acquisition, enjoyment, and transfer of property rights to use water."7 8 One system-the "riparian"
system-is generally utilized in the eastern United States, historically viewed as having plenty of water to go around. 79 Under the
riparian system, an owner of real property whose land "borders a
lake or stream has the right to the reasonable use of the water. 8 0
What constitutes a reasonable use of the water is highly fact-specific and determined on a case-by-case basis, with "the primary
limitation being that it must not interfere unduly with any other
riparian owner's reasonable use of the water.""' Riparian rights
exist whether or not the land owner acts on those rights.8 2 As a
general rule, these rights "cannot be separated from the lands to
which they are appurtenant"8 3 and "riparian owners are entitled
to a continuation of the flow." 8 4 Because the rights run with the
76. Felix S. Cohen et al., Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law 1171 n. 29, 1173
(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2005); Canby, supra n. 66, at 431; see also e.g.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 158 P.3d 377, 399 (Mont. 2007) (Nelson,
J., dissenting).
77. Dan Tarlock, Law of Water Rights and Resources § 1:1, 1-1 (Thomson West 2006)
(noting also that some states employ a dual regime consisting of riparian rights in some
areas and appropriative rights in other areas); Canby, supra n. 66, at 426.
78. Tarlock, supra n. 77, at § 1:1, 1-1; Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 384-85.
79. Tarlock, supra n. 77, at § 1:1, 1-1; Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 384-85; see
also Judith V. Royster, Winters in the East: Tribal Reserved Rights to Water in Riparian
States, 25 Wm.& Mary Envtl. L. & Policy Rev. 169, 169 (2000-2001) ("In the eastern
United States, the riparian system of state water rights developed on the predicate of sufficient water to go around." Today, the abundance of water in the East may "be more myth
than reality.").
80. Canby, supra n. 66, at 426 (emphasis added); Tarlock, supra n. 77, at § 3:7.
81. Canby, supra n. 66, at 426; Tarlock, supra n. 77, at § 3:7.
82. Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 385 (explaining "[r]iparian rights are not lost
through non-use"); Tarlock, supra n. 77, at § 3:7.
83. Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 385; see generally Tarlock, supra n. 77, at § 3:7.
84. Canby, supra n. 66, at 426; Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 385; see generally
Tarlock, supra n. 77, at § 3:7.
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land and entitle owners to a continuation of the flow, the amount
of water a riparian owner can reasonably use is directly related to
the water supply. In other words, if the water supply decreases,
the riparian owner's right to the reasonable use of the water diminishes in proportion to the other riparian owners' rights to that
water supply. 5
The other major system of water rights-the "appropriative"
system-is typically found in the western half of the United
States. 6 The appropriative system of water rights developed as a
method of distributing the limited water supply commonly found
in these often desperately dry states.8 7 There are three main aspects to the appropriative system: (1) "water may be appropriated
separately from the land;"8 8 (2) the priority standard of "first in
time, first in right" applies;8 9 and (3) "water not put to beneficial
use is lost to the appropriator." 90
All three aspects of the appropriative system are necessarily
interconnected based on whether or not the water is being put to a
beneficial use. First, water can be appropriated separately from
the land because appropriative rights are not based on land ownership, but rather on ensuring the water is put to a beneficial
use. 9 1 When the appropriative system was established in the arid
west, putting the water to a beneficial use (for miners and farmers) outweighed the benefit of having water rights run with the
land. Second, priority-a major component of the appropriative
system-is established based on "the first date the water is put to
beneficial use."9 2 Priority is especially important in times of a
drought. The "first in time, first in right" standard ensures that
the first appropriator is allocated the entire amount of entitled
water before the next appropriator gets anything. 9 3 When a water
85. Canby, supra n. 66, at 426; see also Tarlock, supra n. 77, at § 3:10.
86. Canby, supra n. 66, at 426; see also Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 384 (explaining that the appropriative system of water rights is also referred to as the "prior appropriation system"); Tarlock, supra n. 77, at § 1:1.
87. Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 384.
88. Canby, supra n. 66, at 428; see generally Tarlock, supra n. 77, at § 5:26.
89. Canby, supra n. 66, at 428; see generally Tarlock, supra n. 77, at § 5:29.
90. Canby, supra n. 66, at 428; see generally Tarlock, supra n. 77, at § 5:66.
91. Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 385 ("Historically, a beneficial use is one which
removes water from the stream and applies it elsewhere. For example, taking water out of
a stream by way of a canal or ditch and using it to irrigate croplands is a traditional beneficial use. Consequently, the water is often used at a location remote from the source of the
water.").
92. Id.
93. Canby, supra n. 66, at 427.
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source is fully appropriated, the junior appropriators "are at great
risk of losing future supplies in short years, but the [senior] appropriators enjoy a high degree of security." 94 Third, the commonly
used slogan for the appropriative system, "use it or lose it," is especially linked to whether the appropriator has put the water to a
beneficial use. 95 If the water is not being put to a beneficial use,
the appropriator loses the rights to the unrealized water and retains only the amount of water actually utilized. 96 Therefore, failure to use the water constitutes an abandonment of any rights to
97
that water under an appropriative system.
B.

Indian Water Rights: The Winters Doctrine

Standing alone, neither the appropriative nor the riparian
systems 98 apply to the Indians' right to water resources. Rather,
certain ingredients from each system have been blended together
to confer Indian rights to water arising under federal law. 9 9 The
resulting mixture of ingredients gives Indians reserved rights to
water. These reserved rights grant Indian tribes "large, but often
still unquantified amounts of water." 10 0 Indian reserved rights to
water are "not dependent on state substantive law," and are thus
excepted from the "general rule that allocation of water is the
province of the states."1'0
Indian rights to water originate from Winters v. U.S., under
which the implied reservation doctrine was created.1 0 2 This 1908
Supreme Court decision clearly established that Indian rights to
surface water were impliedly reserved at the time lands were set
aside by the United States for Indian reservations. 0 3 In Winters,
94. Id.; see also Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 385 (Appropriators who put water to
beneficial use first in time are referred to as "senior appropriators," and those who put
water to beneficial use later in time are called "junior appropriators.").
95. Canby, supra n. 66, at 427.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Both the riparian and appropriative systems derive their authority from state law.
Id. at 428.
99. Infra pt. ILI.E (discussing "Winters rights" as a combination of the Winters and Arizona holdings).
100. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 1168.

101. Id.
102. Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); but see Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at
384 (asserting that U.S. v.Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), which came before Winters, "may
serve as a source of tribal implied rights to water outside reservation boundaries" for enabling specific purposes, such as fishing).
103. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
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the United States brought suit on behalf of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana to restrain upstream appropriators
from diverting water from the Milk River and thus significantly
10 4 The reservadiminishing the flow of water to the reservation.
tion was created in 1888 by statute which ratified the agreement
5
between the tribe and the United States.1 0 The agreement established that the northern boundary of the reservation was the middle of the Milk River, but, surprisingly, the "agreement was entirely silent as to water." 10 6 Some time later, non-Indian settlers
built dams upstream of the reservation, diverting the natural flow
of Milk River and significantly compromising the Indians' agricul10 7
tural pursuits.
The Supreme Court held that the Fort Belknap tribes held
the "prior and paramount" right to the water, construing "the
1888 agreement in light of the purposes of the reservation system,
the practical need for water in the arid West, and the canons of
1 0 8 The Court
construction for Indian treaties and agreements."
reasoned that if the purpose of the reservation system was to convert the nomadic hunters and gatherers into a society that is "pastoral and civilized," there must have been an implied reservation
of water in order to support that agrarian lifestyle.109 The small
amount of dry land afforded to the Fort Belknap tribes would be
valueless without an implied reservation of water for irrigation
purposes. 110 As such, water became the single most important
part of the equation. Furthermore, the canons of construction of
federal Indian law provide that all ambiguities are to be interpreted in favor of the tribes.1 1 1 The agreement's silence as to
water did not preclude the Indians from water rights because the
Indians would not have agreed to cede their vast amounts of former lands if the relatively small reservation granted to them did
not include water, without which the land would have been a "bar1 12 Conseren waste" totally inadequate to provide for the tribe.
quently, the Court ruled that at the moment of a reservation's cre104. Id. at 565.
105. Id.
106. Cohen, supra n. 76, at 1172.
107. Winters, 207 U.S. at 567.
108. Cohen, supra n. 76, at 1172; Winters, 207 U.S. at 575-78.
109. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
110. Id.; see also infra nf. 132-133 and accompanying text.
111. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
112. Id. at 577; Judith V. Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More Questions
Than Answers, 30 Tulsa L.J. 61, 66 (1994-1995).
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ation, the Indians who occupy the reservation hold an implied reservation of water rights. 113 This holding meant that the Fort
Belknap tribes' water rights vested in 1888, setting the priority
date years before the upstream diversion of water by non-Indians.114
Therefore, the foundation of Indians' reserved rights to water
was set forth by Winters-upon the moment the reservation is created, water rights are impliedly reserved to the tribe or tribes residing within the boundaries of that reservation. 1 15 The reservation's water rights are "reserved in order to carry out the purposes
for which the lands were set aside, and the rights are paramount
to later-asserted water rights perfected under state law." 116
Despite the unequivocal recognition of Indian tribes' water
rights, assertions of these rights were largely absent during the
five decades following the Court's decision in Winters.1 7 In 1973,
the National Water Commission helped explain why actions taken
to realize the water rights owed to Indian tribes were slow-going:
During most of this 50-year period, the United States was pursuing
a policy of encouraging the settlement of the West and the creation
of family-sized farms on its arid lands. In retrospect, it can be seen
that this policy was pursued with little or no regard for Indian
water rights and the Winters doctrine. With the encouragement, or
at least the cooperation, of the Secretary of the Interior-the very
office entrusted with protection of all Indian rights-many large irrigation projects were constructed on streams that flowed through
or bordered Indian Reservations, sometimes above and more often
below the Reservations. With few exceptions the projects were
planned and built by the Federal Government without any attempt
to define, let alone protect, prior rights that Indian tribes might
have had in the waters used for the projects .... In the history of
the United States Government's treatment of Indian tribes, its failure to protect Indian water rights for use on the Reservations it set
aside for them is one of the sorrier chapters. 118

Though seemingly disregarded for a period of time, it is unmistakable that Winters stands for the determination that an In113. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
114. Id. at 577-78 (explaining the "construction of the agreement [made] it unnecessary
to answer the [appellants'] argument" that the agreement creating the reservation was
repealed "by the admission of Montana into the Union and the power over the waters of
Milk River which the State thereby acquired to dispose of them under its laws").
115. Royster, supra n. 112, at 66.
116. Id.
117. Canby, supra n. 66, at 429.
118. Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 386 (quoting National Water Commission, Water
Policies for the Future-FinalReport to the President and to the Congress of the United
States 474-75 (Water Info. Ctr. 1973)).
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dian tribe, at the moment its reservation was created, has reserved rights to water resources in order to fulfill the purposes of
that Indian reservation. But the Winters Court did not address
how the water is measured or allocated. As a practical matter,
how is the reserved water to be quantified? In 1963, the United
States Supreme Court provided an answer to this question in Arizona v. California,119 and thus advanced the Winters doctrine.
C. Quantificationof Indian Water Rights: Arizona and PIA
Since Indian water rights are reserved to fulfill the purposes
of the Indian reservation, 120 and all tribes declare agriculture to
be a purpose (and sometimes the sole purpose) of their reservations,121 it follows that the "primary measure of tribal water
rights is an agricultural measure."'1 22 Therefore, the Supreme
Court 1 23 in Arizona v. California found that the suitable method

for quantifying Indian water rights is the amount of water necessary for the reservation's "practicably irrigable acreage,"' 24 or
what is now commonly known simply as "PIA." In Arizona, the
Court adjudicated competing claims by several parties asserting
water rights to the lower Colorado River and its tributaries. 125 In
its role as trustee for the tribes, 126 the United States entered the
litigation between various states 27 to assert claims on behalf of
five Indian reservations located in Arizona, California, and Ne119. Ariz. I, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
120. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
121. Royster, supra n. 112, at 74 n. 78 (explaining that "[n]o case has rejected an agricultural purpose for any reservation. In addition, no court is likely to reject farming as a
purpose, since one of the goals of the reservation policy was to establish agrarian communities.").
122. Id. at 74.
123. See Ariz. 1, 373 U.S. at 546, 551 (The United States Supreme Court referred the
case to a Special Master to "take evidence, find facts, state conclusions of law, and recommend a decree," all subject to the Court's ultimate discretion. The Special Master conducted a 2-year trial in the court, reviewed substantial amounts of evidence, heard testimony from hundreds, and recorded over 25,000 pages of transcript.).
124. Id. at 600 (affirming the Special Master's method of using PIA as a means to determine the quantity of water reserved to reservations).
125. Id. at 551.
126. Canby, supra n. 66, at 34, and accompanying text.
127. Ariz. 1, 373 U.S. at 546, 551 (The various states included Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah. Arizona invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
over the matter, and "[the other states] and the United States were added as parties either
voluntarily or on motion.").
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vada. 128 Each of the Indian reservations had a stake in the Colo29
rado River litigation.1
The Colorado River is located "in a natural basin almost surrounded by large mountain ranges and [the Colorado River and its
tributaries] drain 242,000 square miles, an area about 900 miles
long from north to south and 300 to 500 miles wide from east to
west." 130 This vast basin has long been plagued by perpetual aridity-in other words, it is hydrologically challenged. From times
long ago to the present it "always has been largely dependent
upon managed use of the waters of the Colorado River System to
make it productive and inhabitable."'1 3 1 In recognition and sup-

port of this proposition, the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Arizona quotes a delegate's statement from the debate that
led to approval of "the first congressional appropriation for irrigation of the Colorado River Indian Reservation.132 The following

statement was made by the delegate from the Territory of Arizona
demonstrating the tribes' irrigational necessity:
Irrigating canals are essential to the prosperity of these Indians.
Without water there can be no production, no life; and all they ask
of you is to give them a few agricultural implements to enable them
to dig an irrigating canal by which their lands may be watered and
their fields irrigated, so that they may enjoy the means of existence.
You must provide these Indians with the means of subsistence or
they will take by robbery from those who have. During the last year

I have seen a number of these Indians starved to death for want of
133

food.

Remarkably, the trial also produced "archeological evidence that
as long as 2,000 years ago the ancient Hohokam tribe built and
maintained irrigation canals near what is now Phoenix, Arizona,
and that American Indians were practicing irrigation in that region at the time white men first explored it."134

Objecting to the quantity of water allocated to the tribes, Arizona argued that the PIA standard yielded an overly excessive
128. Id. at 595-96 (The five Indian reservations were Chemehuevi, Cocopah, Colorado
River, Fort Mohave, and Yuma. Of the five reservations, the largest was the Colorado
River Reservation, which straddles the Arizona-California border.).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 552 (The expansive natural basin containing the flow of the Colorado River
and its tributaries is "practically one-twelfth the area of the continental United States excluding Alaska.").
131. Id.
132. Id. at 599.
133. Ariz. I, 373 U.S. at 599 (quoting Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1321 (1865)).
134. Id. at 552.
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amount of water to the reservations. 135 Arizona believed that the
proper method of quantifying reserved Indian water rights should
turn on the number of Indians on the reservation, which would
more accurately portray a reservation's "reasonably foreseeable
needs."1 3 6 The Supreme Court rejected Arizona's proposed
method of quantifying Indian water rights, reasoning that the
number of Indians residing on a reservation in the future and attempting to predict their future water needs would be too speculative.1 37 Instead, the Supreme Court established the PIA standard
as the "only feasible and fair way by which reserved water for the
reservations can be measured."1 38 The burden of proving PIA lies
with the Tribes.1 3 9 In addition to requiring proof of the technical
and engineering feasibility of irrigating the reservation's acreage,
Court in 1983 to
the PIA standard was amended by the Supreme
140
require proof of economic feasibility as well.
D. Other Issues Arising out of Arizona
Aside from the method of quantifying reserved Indian rights
to water, there are other aspects arising out of Arizona that warrant mentioning. These include: (1) Winters rights extending to
reservations regardless of whether the reservation was created by
treaty, statute, or executive order; (2) Winters rights surviving the
admittance to the Union of the State whose boundary lines surround the reservation; (3) reserved Indian water rights are generally not limited solely to agricultural uses; (4) the rise of settlements with regard to water rights issues and the importance of
135. Id. at 598.
136. Id. at 600-01.
137. Id. at 601.
138. Id.
139. State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235, 245-46 (N.M. App. 1993).
140. Ariz. v. Calif., 460 U.S. 605, 641 (1983) [hereinafterAriz. III]; Dana Smith, Doctrinal Anachronism?: Revisiting the PracticablyIrrigableAcreage Standardin Light of International Law for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 22 Ariz. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 691, 692
(2005); see also David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkenson & Robert A. Williams, Jr., Federal
Indian Law: Cases and Materials 833-35 (4th ed., West 1998) (discussing four disciplines
involved in proving PIA: soil science, hydrology, engineering, and economics. The first
three relate to technical and engineering feasibility while the last encompasses the economic feasibility of quantifying water rights under the PIA standard.); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 101 (Wyo. 1988),
affd sub nom., Wyo. v. U.S., 492 U.S. 406 (1989) [hereinafter Big Horn] (defining PIA as
"those acres susceptible to sustained irrigation at reasonable costs" and stating that "[t]he
determination of practicably irrigable acreage involves a two-part analysis, i.e., the PIA
must be susceptible of sustained irrigation (not only proof of the arability but also of the
engineering feasibility of irrigating the land) and irrigable 'at reasonable cost' ").
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PIA during settlement negotiations; and (5) the future of the PIA
standard.
First, the Court in Arizona was faced with Arizona's argument relating to the manner in which the reservation was created. 14 1 Arizona argued that "water rights cannot be reserved by
Executive Order."14 2 Indian Reservations have historically been
created in one of three ways. Until 1871, it was typical to create
reservations by treaties. 143 After 1871, reservations were created
either by statute-which generally ratified the agreements
reached with the tribes, like the Fort Belknap reservation from
Winters14 4-or by executive order, until 1919 when Congress ended the practice.14 5 The Arizona Court held that the Winters doctrine applies to Indian reservations whether they were created by
treaty, statute, or executive order. 14 6 And the priority date is set
as of the moment the reservation was created. 4 7
Second, the Court in Arizona addressed Arizona's argument
that the federal government, and thus federally-created reservations, relinquished rights to the water upon Arizona's admittance
as a State into the Union. 148 Arizona contended that "lands underlying navigable waters within territory acquired by the Government are held in trust for future States and that title to such
lands is automatically vested in the States upon admission to the
Union."1 4 9 The Court rejected this contention, pointing out that
the cases Arizona relied upon
involved only the shores of and lands beneath navigable waters.
They do not determine the [rights to the waters] and cannot be accepted as limiting the broad powers of the United States to regulate
navigable waters under the Commerce Clause and to regulate government lands under Art. IV, s 3, of the Constitution. 150
141. Ariz. 1, 373 U.S. at 598.
142. Id.
143. Royster, supra n. 112, at 64 n. 8.
144. Id.; Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564, 567-68, 575 (1908).
145. Canby, supra n. 66, at 19 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 150 (stating "[n]o public lands of the
United States shall be withdrawn by Executive Order, proclamation, or otherwise, for or as
an Indian reservation except by act of Congress")).
146. Ariz. 1, 373 U.S. at 598.
147. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577; compare with Royster, supra n. 112, at 70-71 (providing
"[i]n general, if a tribe was using water in its aboriginal territory prior to the creation of the
reservation and those uses were confirmed by the treaty, agreement, or executive order
creating the reservation, the water rights continue with a 'time immemorial' priority
date").
148. Ariz. 1, 373 U.S. at 596.
149. Id. at 597.
150. Id. at 597-98.
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Winters rights are not governed by state substantive law but "are
creatures of federal law, which defines their extent." 15 1 Therefore,
reservations' Winters rights survived admission into the Union by
the states in which the reservations were located.
Third, while the method of quantifying reserved Indian water
rights is based on agricultural use-the amount of water necessary for the reservation's PA-that method generally does not
work to limit the ways the Indians actually put the water to use.
The Supreme Court clarified this in Arizona v. California 11,152
stating that PIA "is the means of determining quantity of adjudicated water rights but shall not constitute a restriction on the us3
age of them to irrigation or other agricultural application."' 5 Following the lead from Arizona II, the Ninth Circuit declared in ColviUle Confederated Tribes v. Walton' 54 that, "[w]hen the Tribe has
a vested property right in reserved water, it may use it in any
lawful manner. As a result, subsequent acts making the historically intended use of water unnecessary do not divest the Tribe of
the right to the water.' 55 This right may be limited, however, if
courts award a tribe a quantity of water for a specific non-consumptive use.156 A non-consumptive use, such as an instream
flow right for a reservation whose purpose is for fisheries protection, may not be changed to a consumptive use. 15 7 Yet most of the
time, the quantity of water reserved for the tribe is based on the
reservation's PIA, in which case a tribe may "use its quantified
58
share of agricultural water for industrial or other purposes."
Fourth, the PIA standard can serve as a nice bargaining chip
in favor of Indian tribes during negotiated settlements of reserved
Indian water rights. Since the 1970s, there has been a growing
trend toward resolving these water disputes by way of negotiated
settlements. This trend has been powered by several factors: (1)
the exorbitant costs of time and money affecting all parties involved in litigation and adjudication of reserved Indian water
rights; (2) the Indians' reluctance to have Indian reserved rights
151. Canby, supra n. 66, at 431.
152. Ariz. v. Calif., 439 U.S. 419 (1979) [hereinafter Ariz. Ill.
153. Id. at 422; Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 438.
154. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
155. Id. at 48.
156. Royster, supra n. 112, at 78 (referring to the decision in Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76,
99-100 (Wyo. 1988)).
157. Id.
158. Canby, supra n. 66, at 434.
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determined through the state court system; 15 9 (3) the realization
that litigation and adjudication will determine the quantity of
water owed to the Indians based on the PIA standard, but often
will not provide "funding for water development projects or delivery systems, and sometimes [limit] water use; 1 60 and (4) during
in disthe lengthy period of litigation and adjudication, the water
61
pute generally continues to be used by non-Indians.
Under the Winters doctrine, an Indian reservation's right to
water arms the Indians with a superior claim to waters because of
16 2
early priority dates, and the right to water despite lack of use.
The PIA standard from Arizona bolsters this right by providing a
method for quantification of the waters owed.' 6 3 While this right
may appear to be superior on paper, in reality, converting it into
"wet" water can be a long and arduous process.1 64 "Most tribal
water rights are quantified through litigation and adjudication,
processes that have lasted decades and which will continue on for
many decades to come."' 6 5
Nevertheless, the current case precedent in favor of the PIA
standard provides sufficient bargaining power for the Indians, creating an incentive for non-Indian parties to settle. During many
settlements, tribes often "waive both their Winters rights to water,
and their claims against the United States with respect to water
in exchange for guarantees of smaller quantities of water and eco1 66
nomic assistance in developing water resources.
Fifth, the future of the PIA standard is unknown. This "uncertainty over the future of the PIA standard may undermine the
predictability that is a necessary prerequisite to successful settle159. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 1210-11 (explaining that for many tribes, the state
court system may be a potentially hostile forum in which to determine their rights to water
because the "pre-adjudication administrative determinations are often made by state agencies, and judicial determinations are made by state judges ultimately answerable to the
voters"); see also 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2006) (providing states subject matter jurisdiction over
Indian water rights which they lacked prior to Congress's enactment of the McCarran
Amendment in 1952).
160. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 1211.
161. Id.
162. Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908); Ariz. I, 373 U.S. 546, 599-600 (1963).
163. See Ariz. I, 373 U.S. at 600.
164. Smith, supra n. 140, at 692.
165. Merianne A. Stansbury, Negotiating Winters: A Comparative Case Study of the
Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, 27 Pub. Land & Res. L. Rev. 131,
132, 132 n. 4 (2006) (explaining that, for example, the Big Hole River basin adjudication
"has been going on since the early 1980s and an estimated $50-80 billion has been spent.
The tribal water rights have still not been quantified.").
166. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 1213-14 (footnotes omitted).
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ments."1 6 7 In 1989, Wyoming v. U.S.168 placed the PIA standard
before the Supreme Court. While the Court "upheld the PIA standard in a four-to-four memorandum opinion," the PIA standard
was very close to being drastically changed. 169 Justice O'Connor
drafted the would-be majority opinion prior to recusing herself
due to a conflict of interest-"her family's ranching corporation
was a party to an adjudication involving Indian water rights.1 7 o
In O'Connor's draft majority opinion the basic PIA standard would
have remained intact, but augmented by a "sensitivity" analysis to
account for the "impact on non-Indian appropriators" who had
171
been putting the waters to beneficial use for some time.
The PIA standard has not been addressed by the United
States Supreme Court since its four-four split in Wyoming, but in
2001, the Arizona Supreme Court decided to reject the PIA standard in In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water
in the Gila River System & Source (hereinafter Gila River V).172
The Arizona Supreme Court "became the first court in the United
States to formally reject the PIA standard [and] instead created a
homeland standard to be used in quantifying Indian water
rights."1 73 Although at first glance the PIA standard appears to
167. Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 392 (quoting 4 Waters and Water Rights
§ 37.02(c)(3) (Robert E. Beck ed., Lexis 1991)).
168. Wyo. v. U.S., 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
169. Smith, supra n. 140, at 692.
170. Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 391.
171. Id. Justice O'Connor's draft majority opinion in Wyoming is reprinted in the appendix to Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in
Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 683, 725-40 (1997).
172. In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. &
Source, 35 P.3d 68, 76 (Ariz. 2001) [hereinafter Gila River V]. In 1974, the Salt River Valley Water Users Association filed a petition in the Arizona state court system to determine
the rights to the Salt, Verde, San Pedro, Gila, Santa Cruz and Agua Fria Rivers. This
petition led the Arizona Supreme Court to issue five significant decisions. The four Gila
River decisions leading up to Gila River V have been nicely summarized as follows:
The 1992 decision (Gila River I) involved a question of acceptable methods of service for notifying the 849,000 people who had potential claims in the Gila River
water rights adjudication. A 1993 decision by the court (Gila River II) dealt with
whether the "subflow" was to be considered surface water or groundwater. The
third major decision by the court, in 1999, was the first one to deal directly with
Indian reserved water rights. In Gila River III, the court addressed the question
of whether Indian reserved water rights included rights not only to surface water,
but to groundwater, as well.... In Gila River V, the court re-examined the definition of "subflow" it crafted in Gila River H.
Smith, supra n. 140, at 710.
173. Smith, supra n. 140, at 692 (referring to Gila River V).
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be objective and fairly straightforward, 17 4 the Gila River V Court
rejected it as a means of quantification after identifying several
problems. 175 First, "an across-the-board application of PIA" may
result in an unfair allocation of waters to a tribe's reservation due
to its geographical location.1 76 The Court gives an example contrasting the effects of PIA on a tribal reservation inhabiting "flat
alluvial plains," with a tribal reservation "dwell[ing] in steep,
mountainous areas."1 7 7 The PIA standard is an advantage to the
former, particularly if the reservation land is adjacent to water
systems. But it creates a severe disadvantage to the latter, which
may be unable to prove that its lands are practicably irrigable
from both a technically and economically feasible standpoint.1 7 8
Second, PIA adopts a method whereby tribes must "pretend to be
farmers" and prove the economic feasibility of a large agricultural
project that "is simply no longer economically feasible in the
West." 17 9 The Court recognized that a tribe's reservation, as a
permanent homeland, "requires water for multiple uses, which
may or may not include agriculture.' 8 0 Third, the PIA standard
has the effect of tempting tribes to "concoct inflated, unrealistic
irrigation projects," diminishing the chance of a true "consideration of actual water needs based on realistic economic choices."' 8 '
PIA awards may provide "an overabundance of water" by factoring
every single acre of irrigable land into the equation, rather than
"focusing on what is necessary to fulfill a reservation's overall design."182

Noting in the dissent that they were entering "uncharted territory," the Gila River V Court replaced the PIA standard with a
multi-faceted approach-evaluated on a reservation-by-reservation basis-designed to determine the amount of federally re174. See Gila River V, 35 P.3d at 77-78 (explaining the PIA standard "implies a two-step
process. First, it must be shown that crops can be grown on the land, considering arability
and the engineering practicality of irrigation. Second, the economic feasibility of irrigation
must be demonstrated." (internal citations omitted)).
175. Id. at 78.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (explaining that tribes failing to show "either the engineering or economic feasibility of proposed irrigation projects run the risk of not receiving any reserved water under
PIA").
179. Id.
180. Gila River V, 35 P.3d at 78; but see supra nn. 153-158 and accompanying text demonstrating that the PIA standard is a method of quantifying; however, once quantified the
Indian reservation may use that water for purposes other than agricultural uses.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 79.
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served waters necessary to satisfy a reservation's minimum need
to accomplish its purpose.' 8 3 The tribes should present evidence
of actual and proposed uses of water, "accompanied by the parties'
recommendations regarding the feasibility and the amount of
water necessary to accomplish the homeland purpose." 18 4 When
evaluating this evidence, courts should consider certain key factors including, among others: (1) the tribe's history, rituals, culture, and traditions involving water use; 8 5 (2) "the tribal land's
geography, topography, and natural resources, including groundwater availability"; 8 6 (3) the tribe's "economic base"; 8 7 (4) the
tribe's past water use; 8 8 and (5) the tribe's present and projected

population. 139
Despite the uncertainty of the PIA standard's future created
by Justice O'Connor's draft majority opinion' 90 and the Arizona
Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Gila River V,191 "the demise of
the PIA standard is not inevitable.' 9 2 The Supreme Court established the PIA standard in Arizona I because it was "unwilling[ I
to tolerate the uncertainties inherent in a 'reasonably foreseeable
needs' standard, and ... has reaffirmed the need for certainty in
water rights adjudications repeatedly."' 9 3 While the Supreme
Court has reaffirmed Arizona I on more than one occasion, 19 4 the
multi-faceted approach promulgated by the Arizona Supreme
Court in Gila River V could be viewed as a "reasonably foreseeable
needs" standard, thus establishing uncertainty in future water
rights adjudications. Whether the PIA standard survives into the
future, is modified, or is replaced by another quantification
method, one thing is certain-Indian reservations are entitled to a
reserved amount of water necessary to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation.
183. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 79-80.
186. Gila River V, 35 P.3d at 80.
187. Id. (explaining the tribes' "[pihysical infrastructure, human resources, including
present and potential employment base, technology, raw materials, financial resources,
and capital are all relevant in viewing a reservation's economic infrastructure").
188. Id.
189. Id. (noting that this "should never be the only factor" but is necessary to fully evaluate the quantity of water necessary to meet the human needs).
190. Supra nn. 167-171 and accompanying text.
191. Supra nn. 172-189 and accompanying text.
192. Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 392 (quoting 4 Waters and Water Rights
§ 37.02(c)(3) (Robert E. Beck ed., Lexis 1991)).
193. Id.
194. Id.
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"Winters Rights": The Combination of Winters and Arizona

Today's "Winters rights"-the phrase often used to describe
reserved Indian rights to water-are formulated from a synthesis
of the Winters and Arizona v. California cases. 19 5 Winters rights
can be summed up into five primary characteristics.1 96 First,
Winters rights are "not dependent on [state] substantive law," and
are thus excepted from the "general rule that allocation of water is
the province of the states."'19 7 The admission into the Union of the
State whose boundary lines surround the reservation neither
evaporates Winters rights nor grants states the authority over this
reserved right.198 Second, a reservation of water rights is implicit
in the establishment of the Indian reservation, whether the reservation was created by treaty, executive order, or statutory agreement. 199 Third, the priority date upon which the Winters rights
attach is the date the Indian reservation was created. The importance of this cannot be overestimated because most reservations
were established long before non-Indian settlers began putting the
water to beneficial use. 20 0 This gives Indian reservations superior
water rights to most users under the appropriative system. 20 '
Fourth, Winters rights will be quantified using the PIA standard,
which is the "amount sufficient to irrigate all the practicably irrigable acreage of the reservation. ' 20 2 The PIA standard "implies a
two-step process: First, it must be shown that crops can be grown
on the land, considering arability and the engineering practicality
of irrigation. Second, the economic feasibility of irrigation must be
demonstrated." 20 3 Importantly, the PIA standard, while quantifying water rights based on the amount of acres which can be
practicably irrigated, generally does not restrict the Indian reservation from using the water for non-agricultural uses. 20 4 Fifth,
195. Canby, supra n. 66, at 431.
196. Id. at 431-32.
197. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 1168; see also Canby, supra n. 66, at 431.
198. Supra nn. 147-150 and accompanying text.
199. Canby, supra n. 66, at 431.
200. Royster, supra n. 112, at 70.
201. Id. For a thorough discussion of the effect Winters rights would have under a riparian water system (generally used in the eastern states), see Judith V. Royster, supra n. 79,
at 169.
202. Canby, supra n. 66, at 431; but see supra nn. 172-189 and accompanying text
describing the Arizona Supreme Court's rejection of the PIA standard in Gila River V.
203. Gila River V, 35 P.3d 68, 77-78 (Ariz. 2001).
204. Supra nn. 153-158 and accompanying text.
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Winters rights are not dependent on use, but rather run with the
20 5
reservation.
In addition to synthesizing the holdings of Winters and Arizona v. California, Winters rights can also certainly be viewed as
an advantageous combination of the riparian and appropriative
systems, the two primary state water systems in the United
States. 20 6 On one hand, the appropriative system works to the advantage of one who has an early appropriation date. 20 7 Those
with an early appropriation date have tremendous security in the
waters, even in the event of a drought, because the senior appropriators will be entitled to their entire share of the water before
junior appropriators can get any. 20 8 But under the appropriative
system, one must continuously put the appropriated water to beneficial use to avoid losing the unused portion-if you don't use it,

you lose

it.209

On the other hand, riparian rights apply to waters appurtenant to the land, and the water rights run with the land. 2 10 The
rights are not lost through non-use, but exist for the owner's use
at any time. 2 11 In the event of a drought, however, the riparian
owner's "reasonable use" of the water diminishes proportionately
2 12
to other riparian owners' "reasonable use" of the water.
Winters rights utilize the benefits of both the appropriative
and riparian systems, seemingly without running into any of the
associated pitfalls. Utilizing the priority standard of "first in time,
first in right" from the appropriative system, the Indian reservations are given a priority date equivalent to the date the Indian
reservation was established. Consequently, Winters rights almost
guarantee that the reservations have superior rights to the waters
because these dates generally precede even the earliest appropriation of water in the West. Borrowing from the riparian system,
Winters rights "apply most clearly to water bordering, crossing or
within (i.e., appurtenant to) the Indian land,"2 13 and remarkably,
"Winters rights to water are not lost by non-use. '21 4 The resulting
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Canby, supra n. 66, at 432.
Id.
Supra nn. 86-90 and accompanying text.
Supra n. 93 and accompanying text.
Supra n. 95 and accompanying text.
Supra nn. 79-85 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
Canby, supra n. 66, at 432.
Id.
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mixture of appropriative and riparian elements grants the Indian
2 15
reservation superior rights to waters.
On January 6, 2008, Winters celebrated its 100th birthday.
The PIA standard from Arizona was established over 40 years ago.
Yet "[m] any tribes are just beginning to assert their unexercised
water rights."2 16 Because Winters rights to water are not lost by
non-use, these long dormant claims can create a tremendous
amount of tension and controversy. In the arid West, the assertion and quantification of Winters rights will certainly wreak
havoc on non-Indian prior appropriators, placing them at substantial risk. The PIA standard, when quantified, can yield a vast
amount of water. The Indian reservation's rights to this water
will, in most cases, come before even the earliest non-Indian appropriators. The Indians' superior rights to water have the potential to deplete previous, but junior, users of their entire water
source. It is a sticky situation, to say the least.
Non-Indians argue that satisfaction of a reservation's Winters
rights "defeats the entire purpose of the appropriative system,
which was to create certainty that would stimulate beneficial
use." 2 17 Many of the non-Indian appropriators have spent substantial amounts of money, time, and effort creating transportation and irrigation systems to make beneficial use of unused
water. 2 18 On the other hand, Indians argue that "the reason for
their non-use of the water was the failure of the United States to
fulfill its responsibility as trustee in developing and protecting
water resources, and that it would only compound injury to de21 9
prive the tribes of their water forever."
F.

PeripheralIssues Related to Reserved Indian Water Rights

Beginning with the decisions from U.S. v. Winans 220 and Winters, and continuing to the present time, United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence has crafted clear and superior Winters rights
entitling Indian reservations to a reserved amount of water to ful215. See e.g. John B. Carter, Indian Aboriginal and Reserved Water Rights, An Opportunity Lost, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 377, 377-78 (2003) ("[D]ivisive state and federal litigations...
have consistently confirmed the dominance of federally-protected Indian reserved water
rights over rights asserted under Montana state law.").
216. Canby, supra n. 66, at 436.
217. Id. at 436-37.
218. Id. at 437.
219. Id.
220. U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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fill its purposes. These rights, however, are only clear and superior on paper. Converting these superior rights to "wet" water has
proven to be quite an obstacle for tribes and their reservations.
Today, many Winters rights have yet to be quantified and thus
remain unrealized.
As difficult as it is to convert the clearly established rights to
water into actual water, there are other issues that have not been
clearly dealt with by the Supreme Court. These issues include
whether Winters rights (1) apply to groundwater and (2) include a
right to water quality. As one can imagine, the answers to these
questions are in a state of flux. Yet there appear to be sound arguments in favor of determining each of the above issues in the affirmative. While a full discussion of these issues is beyond the
scope of this article, some basic arguments in support of this proposition are offered below.
1.

Whether Winters Rights Apply to Groundwater

Winters rights, or reserved rights, entitle Indian reservations
to a sufficient amount of water to fulfill the purposes of the reservation. The application of Winters rights to surface waters is well
accepted, but "whether Indian tribes will successfully secure re22 1
served rights to groundwater remains an open question."
Before examining whether Winters rights apply to groundwater,
the scientific reality of the hydrological connection between surface water and groundwater will be presented. A brief summary
of how the courts have handled this issue will follow.
a.

Hydrological Connection between Surface Water and
Groundwater

Today, billions of people around the world depend on groundwater to meet basic needs. 22 2 For millions of people globally, accessibility and consumptive use of groundwater is essential. 2 23 To
demonstrate, seventy-five percent of many European nations'
drinking water comes from groundwater. 2 24 Fifty percent of all
221. Debbie Shoesteck, Beyond Reserved Rights: Tribal Control over Groundwater Resources in a Cold Winters Climate, 28 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 325, 326 (2003).
222. Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground Water Resources and InternationalLaw, 19 Am. U. Intl. L. Rev. 201, 202
(2003).
223. Id. at 201-02.
224. Id. at 202. "In Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, and Slovenia," at least 90% of drinking water comes from groundwater. Id.
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drinking water in the United States comes from groundwater, and
"in rural areas of the country, the percentage is as high as ninetyseven percent." The expanding population coupled with the substantial growth in industry and agriculture over the last two decades has caused many to rely on groundwater "as a chief source
of fresh water."22 5 The groundwater that is "technically and economically reachable" constitutes "more than thirty-three times
the volume of water found in the world's lakes and streams. 2 2 6
Amazingly, "[t]he total volume of readily usable groundwater, i.e.,
accessible and not saline, is estimated at approximately 4.2 x 106
km3 , while lakes and streams contain only about 0.126 x 106 km3
22 7
of fresh water."
The regulation of water differs from state to state in the treatment of surface water and groundwater. Some states regulate
water in a conjunctive fashion without distinguishing between
surface water and groundwater. 2 28 Other states "conjunctively
manage their water resources only in specific critical areas, not
the entire state."22 9 Several states, however, regulate water-including use and ownership rights-by regarding surface water
separately from groundwater. These states, such as Arizona,
manage surface water wholly apart from groundwater with no directive to coordinate with the management of groundwater. 230
These systems, treating surface water as distinct from
groundwater, have been legislatively or judicially created without
an understanding of scientific realities. 23 1 Surface water is inseparably interconnected with groundwater as part of the overall
hydrologic cycle, where water in all of its forms (solid, liquid, gas,
or vapor) "travels from the atmosphere to the Earth and back
again in a constant cycle of renewal." 2 32 The water contained in
the atmosphere returns to the Earth by precipitation in the form
of rain, snow, and sleet. 23 3 This precipitation either runs "over
225. Id. at 202-03.
226. Id. at 204.
227. Id.
228. Joe Gelt, Managing the Interconnected Waters: The Groundwater-SurfaceWater Dilemma, http://ag.arizona.edu/AZWATER/arroyo/081con.html (accessed Mar. 21, 1008)
[hereinafter Groundwater-SurfaceWater Dilemma].
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Shoesteck, supra n. 221, at 335 (stating "[e]ither lack of knowledge about the movement of water underground or an unwillingness to tackle hydrologic reality within a legal
scheme has led courts to develop a dual regime of water law").
232. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra n. 222, at 207.
233. Id.
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the land into streams, rivers, and lakes, or it percolates into the
earth. '2 34 The sun evaporates the water remaining on the surface
of the Earth and the cycle continues. 235 The water that percolates
into the earth's crust continues downward "until it reaches the
ground water table, where it flows in a more lateral direction
through the porous spaces of the geologic formation, thereby forming an aquifer." 2 36 It is a scientific fact that
[giround water is a significant component of the hydrologic cycle.
This is especially evident given the exponentially vast quantity of
water found under the ground. From a hydrological point of view,
however, one should view ground water as neither similar nor dissimilar to surface water resources. Ground and surface waters are,
in fact, part and parcel of the same thing; namely, water moving
through the various stages of the hydrologic cycle. Accordingly, it is
inappropriate for optimal productivity and sustainable use ... to
and regulation of ground and surface
bifurcate the management
2 37
water resources.

b.

Court Treatment of Winters Rights Extending to
Groundwater

To date, Cappaert v. U.S.238 has been the only United States
Supreme Court case involving Winters rights and groundwater.
Instead of resolving this groundwater question, the Court "artfully skirted the issue by determining that the underground water
in question was in fact surface water."23 9 This holding overturned
the Ninth Circuit's decision which expressly found that Winters
rights extend to groundwater. 2 40 While the Court did not specifically address whether Winters rights extend to groundwater, "its
holding acknowledged the hydrological connection between surface water and groundwater, thereby creating a significant foundation for future doctrinal exploration of the groundwater issue."

2 4 1

Subsequently, most post-Cappaert courts directly addressing
the issue "have determined that the tribal reserved right extends
234. Id. at 207-08.
235. Id. at 208.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
238. Cappaertv. U.S., 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976).
239. Shoesteck, supra n. 221, at 330.
240. U.S. v. Cappaert,508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974), overruled, Cappaertv. U.S., 426
U.S. 128 (1976).
241. Shoesteck, supra n. 221, at 331.
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to groundwater resources. ''24 2 The Wyoming Supreme Court is
the only state court addressing this issue that did not extend Winters rights to groundwater. 2 43 After acknowledging that "[t]he
logic which supports a reservation of surface water to fulfill the
purpose of the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater," the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to extend Winters
rights to groundwater. 24 4 The Wyoming Supreme Court based its
decision on the unconvincing argument that "not a single case applying the reserved water doctrine to groundwater is cited to
us."2 45 In contrast, the Arizona Supreme Court's reasoning
blended the jurisprudence contained in Winters and Cappaert to
find: "The significant question for the purpose of the reserved
rights doctrine is not whether the water runs above or below the
ground but whether it is necessary to accomplish the purpose of
'246
the reservation.
Although "rooted in favorable Supreme Court jurisprudence
and conform[ing] to hydrologic reality," the Arizona Supreme
Court's conclusion that Winters rights extend to groundwater is
not likely to stand, according to one commentator, due to "political
and doctrinal support confining the scope of reserved rights to surface water. '2 47 If this commentator is correct and-despite the
"modern trend" of recognizing Winters rights to groundwater 2 4 8political pressures are allowed to cloud sound judgment and reasoning, an Indian reservation's claim to a water source that is becoming increasingly important will tragically be cut off.
2. Whether Winters Rights also Encompass a Right to Water
Quality
Although generally litigated as a right to a certain quantity of
water, water quality in its natural state must certainly be implicit
under the Winters doctrine. 24 9 In Winters, Justice McKenna pro242. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 1178.
243. Id.; see Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 99 (Wyo. 1988).
244. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 99.
245. Id.
246. In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. &
Source, 989 P.2d 739, 747-48, 750 (Ariz. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1250 (2000) [hereinafter Gila III]; see e.g. U.S. v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, No. C01-0047Z, slip op. at 12-13 (W.D.
Wash. May 20, 2005); ConfederatedSalish & Kootenai Tribes of the FlatheadReservation v.
Stults, 59 P.3d 1093, 1099 (Mont. 2002).
247. Shoesteck, supra n. 221, at 368.
248. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 1178.
249. Royster, supra n. 112, at 85; Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 1199-1201.
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vided a statement of the case prior to his majority opinion.250
Within this statement, Justice McKenna recognized the assertion
that "it is essential and necessary that all of the waters of the
and undiminished in
river flow down the channel uninterruptedly
25 1
quality.
in
quantity and undeteriorated
The Winters Court went on to hold that Indian reservations
are entitled to a reserved amount of water in order to fulfill the
purposes of the reservation. The Court held that this water was
impliedly reserved at the time lands were set aside by the United
States for Indian reservations. 25 2 The reserved water was implied
because the statutory agreement between the Fort Belknap tribes
and the United States government was silent as to water
rights. 2 53 Like the statutory agreement establishing the Indian
reservation, the Winters majority opinion was also silent as to
whether the implied reserved right to water includes a right to
25 4
water quality.
Does this mean no such right exists? On the contrary, there is
only one logical explanation, which this article will refer to as "Indian Reserved Rights to Water, Twice Implied." A right to sufficient water quality must be implied from the Winters holding. Indian reserved rights to water are "twice implied" because (1) the
amount of water was impliedly reserved by the United States
upon the establishment of Indian reservations, and (2) it is implicit within the implied reservation doctrine created by the Winters Court that those reserved waters be of a sufficient quality to
fulfill the purposes of the Indian reservation.
Whether those purposes involve the non-consumptive use of
maintaining fisheries or the consumptive uses of "irrigation, livestock watering, and household use," a certain quality of water is
absolutely necessary. 2 55 While the water quality necessary may
vary depending on the use,2 56 each use clearly demands water
250. Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564, 565-73 (1908).
251. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
252. Id. at 576-78.
253. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 1172.
254. Water quality was not at issue in Winters. The water from the Milk River was not
being polluted, it was being diverted. It is reasonable to conclude that if the Milk River had
been polluted or otherwise contaminated by the upstream appropriators, Winters would
have expressly stood for a reserved right to both a certain quantity and quality of the
water.
255. Id. at 1200.
256. Id. (explaining that human consumption would demand a high quality of water;
fish and wildlife habit preservation could use water of lesser quality; and irrigation would
be possible with an even lower quality of water).
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that is "clean enough to support that use."2 5 7 The Winters doctrine would not be satisfied if the reserved water provided to the
reservation to fulfill its purposes was polluted or otherwise
unusable or unnatural.
Alternatively, if there is no right to water quality under the
Winters doctrine, then tribes must simultaneously seek water
quality protection under the applicable federal environmental
statutes while pursuing their other Winters rights. Under these
statutes, tribes may gain "program authorization for the environmental programs mandated under the acts" in order to assert concerns related to water quality of the reservation. 258 The Clean
Water Act (CWA), for example, states a shared objective of the
States and the Federal Government "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. ' '25 9 In 1987, the Congress amended the CWA to "extend this
cooperative federalism framework to include Indian tribes. '2 60
This amendment provides that upon application and approval by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), an Indian tribe may
receive a "Treatment as State" (TAS) designation. 26 1 Once a tribe
is granted TAS status by the EPA, it "will have the same regulatory opportunities as a state under the CWA. ' ' 262 To date, however, only thirty tribes have earned TAS status, and thus manage
approved water quality standards under the CWA.263 The programs available under the federal environmental statutes are "not
available to all tribes and do not cover all water resources." 2 64
Since TAS status is not automatic, a Winters right to water
quality "would provide tribes with an additional and important
means of ensuring clean water resources in Indian country."2 65
With increasing numbers of water disputes entering into negotiated settlements, a Winters right to water quality would serve as a
257. Id.
258. Royster, supra n. 112, at 85 n. 142.
259. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
260. Paul M. Drucker, Wisconsin v. EPA- Tribal Empowerment and State Powerlessness
under § 518(E) of the Clean Water Act, 5 U. Denver Water L. Rev. 323, 340 (2002).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 341.
263. EPA, Tribal Water Quality Standards,http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/
wqslibrary/tribes.html (accessed Mar. 21, 2008); see also William H. Rodgers, Treatment as
Tribe, Treatment as State: The Penobscot Indians and the Clean Water Act, 55 Ala. L. Rev.
815, 825 (2004). As of 2003, only 23 tribes had TAS status with "[sleveral more tribes ... in
various stages of the delegation process." Id. at 819.
264. Royster, supra n. 112, at 85 n. 142.
265. Id.
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powerful bargaining chip, bolstering tribes' positions in their efforts to protect reservation waters.
JURISDICTIONAL AWARENESS, INCLUDING WHERE A TRIBE
MAY SEEK REDRESS

IV.

As previously discussed, the State of Oklahoma is suing several Arkansas poultry companies whose activities are believed 2to
66
be destroying the waters in the Illinois River Watershed (IRW).
The Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma and the Oklahoma
Secretary of the Environment filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of
26 7 The complaint states that the
Oklahoma to protect the waters.
"State of Oklahoma holds all natural resources . . . within the political boundaries of Oklahoma in trust on behalf and for the benefit of the public." 268 It is quite possible that the political boundaries of the State of Oklahoma would not include tribal reservations located within Oklahoma's state lines. What can Indian
tribes located within the State of Oklahoma do to protect their waters from non-Indian private parties whose activities are polluting
the precious waters necessary for the tribe to maintain its health
and welfare? Does a tribe have jurisdiction over these parties
when they are located not only off reservation, but outside the
State where the reservation is located? Does it matter whether
the State is already pursuing an action against the polluters? If
so, must the tribe join that action? Can they join? Do they want
to join? And if the tribe can successfully exert jurisdiction over
the polluters, where should the adjudication take place-tribal
court, state court, or federal court?
To understand the answers to the above questions, four jurisdictional areas must be explored: (1) the basic characteristics of
civil jurisdiction as it relates to Indian Law; (2) the importance of
the second exception provided in Montana v. U.S., the CWA, TAS
status, and analogous case law; (3) whether jurisdiction lies in
tribal, state, or federal court; and (4) objections to jurisdiction defendants could raise in this situation.
A.

Civil Jurisdiction:Basic Application to Indian Law

An understanding of Indian Law routinely involves the intellectual juggling of complex legal theory that is hard to get one's
266. Supra nn. 48-63 and accompanying text.
267. Supra n. 49 and accompanying text.
268. Supra n. 56 and accompanying text.
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hands around. It may be comforting to note, however, that most
"controversies in Indian Law usually have at their core a jurisdictional dispute."2 69 If a governmental body possesses jurisdiction,
it has the authority "to exercise power over persons or prop2 70
erty."
In order to have civil jurisdiction, civil law must "determine if
there existed a legal relationship that has been violated, who is to
blame for that violation, and how the offender can remedy the loss
suffered by the harmed individual."2 7 1 Civil jurisdiction can be divided into two categories: (1) legislative or regulatory jurisdiction;
and (2) adjudicative jurisdiction.2 7 2 Legislative or regulatory jurisdiction grants a government the "power to regulate or tax persons or property" 273 -in effect, the authority to "make laws over
people and things. '' 274 For example, legislative or regulatory jurisdiction would "include hunting and fishing laws, environmental
laws, and zoning laws. ''2 75 On the other hand, adjudicative jurisdiction "concerns the power of a court to decide a case or to impose
an order." 27 6 Determining whether adjudicative jurisdiction exists necessarily depends on an analysis of both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. 2 77
Subject matter jurisdiction is "the ability of a court to hear a
particular kind of case, either because it involves a particular subject matter or because it is brought by a particular type of plaintiff
or against a particular type of defendant." 2 78 For issues affecting
tribes, the determination of subject matter jurisdiction-in tribal,
state, or federal courts-typically turns on two issues: "(1)
269. Canby, supra n. 66, at 2 (stating the scope of Indian law reaches "those situations in
which a legal outcome is affected by the Indian status of the participants or the subject
matter").
270. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 597.
271. Justin B. Richland & Sarah Deer, Introduction to Tribal Legal Studies, 163 (Altamira Press 2004).
272. Id.; Canby, supra n. 66, at 124; Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 597.
273. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 597 (stating "[t]he scope of legislative jurisdiction is
determined by a variety of sources of law, including treaties, constitutions, statutes, and
regulations").
274. Richland & Deer, supra n. 271, at 164 (emphasis omitted).
275. Id. (emphasis added). "Congress and administrative agencies like the [EPA] have
passed laws and policies authorizing tribes to make laws regulating pollution and polluters
within tribal territorial borders." Id. Importantly, under these federal environmental laws
and policies, "tribes are authorized to set standards at or above the standards set by the
federal government, but never below, regardless of land-ownership patterns." Id. at 185
(emphasis in original).
276. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 597.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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whether the parties involved are Indians or, in some applications,
tribal members, and (2) whether the events in issue took place in
'27 9
Indian country.
Personal jurisdiction is "the ability of a court to require a particular defendant to defend a lawsuit and be bound by the court's
judgment."28 0 It is possible for a court to have adjudicative jurisdiction while lacking legislative jurisdiction over the defendant,
and, although not as common, it is possible for a court28 1to have
legislative jurisdiction but not adjudicative jurisdiction.
Importantly, as to non-Indians or nonmembers, a tribe's assertion of adjudicative jurisdiction "does raise questions of federal
law ... reviewable in federal court." 2 2 While the Supreme Court
has on numerous occasions "suggested that adjudicative and legislative jurisdiction are separate inquiries" for tribal, state, and federal courts, two recent Supreme Court cases have stated, "[als to
nonmembers, a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its
legislative jurisdiction. ' 28 3 Therefore, absent congressional authorization, a tribal court will not have adjudicative jurisdiction
over non-Indians or nonmembers if the tribal court does not have
legislative jurisdiction. 2 4 Yet, determining legislative jurisdiction over non-Indians or nonmembers is very difficult, mainly because the terminology employed by the Supreme Court in distinguishing tribal members and nonmembers on one hand, and Indians and non-Indians on the other hand, has not been consistently
28 5
applied.
B.

Montana's Second Exception, the CWA, TAS, and Analogous
Case Law

Who has jurisdiction over a non-Indian entity whose activities
are polluting the water flowing within a state's boundaries? The
state certainly has jurisdiction, as evidenced by the recently filed
279.
(2006),
280.
281.
282.

Canby, supra n. 66, at 125; see supra n. 65 (providing the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1151
defining Indian country).
Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 597.

Id. at 598.
Id. at 599.
283. Id. at 598-99 (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors,520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997)); see also
Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 357-58 (2001) (relying on the Supreme Court's statement made
in Strate).
284. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 600.
285. Id. at 600 n. 23.
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Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods.28 6 But what about the tribes located on
reservations within that state? Now enter Montana, the CWA,
and TAS-along with some helpful court opinions-to shed light
on this scenario.
1.

Montana v. U.S.

It is clearly established that a tribal government has exclusive jurisdiction over a claim between an Indian and another Indian when the source of the claim arose in Indian country. 2 87 This
exclusive power granting tribes the ability to "make and apply
civil law to people and things in its territory is a fundamental part
of their inherent sovereign power as nations."28 8 Tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, however, is much less clear, and has been
substantially limited by the United States Congress and the Su28 9
preme Court over the years.
In 1981, Montana v. U.S. severely limited tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. 2 90 In Montana, the Crow Tribe of Montana
was attempting to exert its civil regulatory jurisdiction over nonIndians on non-Indian fee land within the reservation. 29 1 Believing it had the power to do so based on "its purported ownership of
the bed of the Big Horn River, on treaties which created its reservation, and on its inherent power as a sovereign," the Crow Tribe
enacted a regulation prohibiting nonmembers from hunting and
fishing while on any land found within the reservation, including
the non-Indian land held by non-Indians in fee simple. 2 9 2 The
State of Montana asserted that it had that regulatory power, not
2 93
the Tribe.
When analyzing how far the tribe's inherent sovereignty
would extend, the Court borrowed reasoning from its opinion in
U.S. v. Wheeler.2 94 The Court recognized that Indian tribes are
286. Okla. ex rel. Edmonson v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (N.D. Okla. Aug. 19, 2005); see supra
nn. 48-63 and accompanying text.
287. Canby, supra n. 66, at 225 (providing a useful chart for determining civil jurisdiction involving particular parties and the location of the claim); see also Richland & Deer,
supra n. 271, at 165.
288. Richland & Deer, supra n. 271, at 165.
289. Id.
290. Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 563-64 (1981).
291. Id. at 548-49.
292. Id. at 547.
293. Id. at 549.
294. U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (superseded by statute, U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S.
193 (2004)).
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"unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over
both their members and their territory,"2 95 but noted that certain
historical events-such as the Indians' "original incorporation into
the United States [and] specific treaties and statutes"-have
worked to curtail many of their inherent sovereign powers. 29 6 The
Court in Montana further drew from Wheeler to explain the areas
of sovereignty that have been divested, and those inherent powers
that remain:
The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been
held to have occurred are those involving the relations between an
Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe....
These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status of
Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine their external
relations. But the powers of self-government, including the power
to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a different
type. They involve only the relations among members of a tribe.
Thus, they are not such powers as would necessarily be lost by vir2 97
tue of a tribe's dependent status.

The Court found that without express congressional delegation,
"the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to
the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."2 98 As a result, the
Court ruled that the "general principles of retained inherent sovereignty did not authorize the Crow Tribe to" regulate "hunting
and fishing by nonmembers of a tribe on lands no longer owned by
2 99
the tribe."
This holding-viewed as a substantial limitation on tribal
civil jurisdiction-did not, however, completely divest tribal power
to assert civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. Importantly, the
Court in Montana carved out two exceptions 30 0 that would enable
tribes to "retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms
of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on
non-Indian fee lands."30 1 The first exception turns on whether the
non-Indian has entered into "consensual relations" with the tribe
(most notably in the form of business contracts, commercial trans295. Mont., 450 U.S. at 563 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (internal quotations omitted)).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 564 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added; internal quotations
omitted)).
298. Id. at 565.
299. Id. at 564-65.
300. See e.g. Nord v. Kelly, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (D. Minn. 2007) (referring to
these exceptions as the "Montanaexceptions").
301. Mont., 450 U.S. at 565.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/4

38

Hanlon: Indian Water Rights

2008

INDIAN WATER RIGHTS

actions, and leases), and does not apply to the scenario posed by
this article. 30 2 The second exception, however, is of extreme importance to the issue at hand. This exception, the "direct effects"
test, allows a tribe to "retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and
welfare of the tribe."30 3 Under the "direct effects" test, this inherent power of tribal civil jurisdiction will be evident if any of the
three factors-political integrity, economic security, or health or
welfare-is threatened or directly affected. 30 4 A strong argument
can be made that a non-Indian individual or entity whose activities are polluting the tribe's water supply will not only threaten,
but have some direct effect on the political integrity and the economic security of the tribe. But an even stronger argument under
the "direct effects" test is that contamination of the tribe's waters
will have a "serious and substantial effect" on the health and wel30 5
fare of the tribe.
In Montana, however, the non-Indians involved were located
within the reservation's borders. How can Montana's second exception extend to confer the tribe with personal jurisdiction over a
non-Indian entity situated off the reservation? Cohen's Handbook
of Federal Indian Law suggests "a non-Indian defendant whose
conduct threatens or directly affects tribal interests within the
meaning of Montana's second exception, is very likely to have minimum contacts with the forum sufficient to justify the tribal
30 6
court's personal jurisdiction."
Therefore, the tribal government would have neither regulatory nor adjudicative jurisdiction over off-reservation, non-Indian
polluters when that polluted water is located outside the boundaries of the reservation. But as soon as that polluted water flows
302. Id. (stating under the first exception "[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements"); see also Richland & Deer, supra n. 271, at 166.
303. Mont., 450 U.S. at 566 (emphasis added).
304. Id.
305. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
431 (1989) (modifying the second exception under Montana, requiring that the regulated
activity's effect be "demonstrably serious" before a tribe's inherent sovereign authority applied); see also Drucker, supra n. 260, at 352 (explaining that to reflect the jurisprudence
found in Montana and Brendale, the EPA will "require a showing that the potential impacts of regulated activities on the tribe are serious and substantial"(emphasis added)).
306. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 605.
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into the reservation and threatens or directly affects the health or
welfare of the tribe, civil jurisdiction over the off-reservation, nonIndian polluters would attach.
2.

The Clean Water Act and a Tribe's Treatment as a State

But for the two exceptions carved out of the majority opinion,
Montana (as well as other Supreme Court cases in this area) drastically undercuts Indian sovereignty by limiting tribal powers of
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. Paradoxically, and fortunately
for Indian tribes, the federal government has also enhanced this
power through certain federal environmental laws like the Clean
Water Act (CWA), which have been amended to give tribes "Treatment as State" (TAS) status. The CWA's objective is "restoration
and maintenance of chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters." 30 7 The CWA has been described by the Supreme Court as "an all encompassing program of water pollution
regulation ... [whose] major purpose ... was to establish a comprehensive long range policy for the elimination of water pollution."30 8 The CWA lists two national goals and five national policies to reach its objective, including: (1) eliminating the discharge
of pollutants into navigable waters; (2) ensuring water quality
that "provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish,
and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water"; and
(3) prohibiting "the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic
30 9
amounts."
Water quality under the CWA is determined using two different measures. The first uses "effluent limitations guidelines,"
which are "uniform, technology-based standards promulgated by
the EPA, which restrict the quantities, rates and concentrations of
specified substances discharged from point sources." 3 10 The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) falls
under this measure. The NPDES requires that "a permit be obtained before any 'point source' may discharge pollutants into navigable waters." 3 1 1 The second measure uses "water quality stand307. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
308. Drucker, supra n. 260, at 326 (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Ill., 451 U.S. 304, 318
(1981) (internal citations omitted; brackets in original)).
309. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
310. Drucker, supra n. 260, at 327 (quoting City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415,
419 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1996)).
311. Royster & Blumm, supra n. 23, at 228; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000) (defining "point
source" as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
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ards" that "are not based on pollution control technologies, but ex3 12
press the desired condition or use of a particular waterway."
The second measure supplements the first "so that numerous
point sources, despite individual compliance with the effluent limitations, may be further regulated to prevent water quality from
falling below acceptable levels." 3 13 Practically "all water pollution
3 14
control under the CWA" derives from these two measures.
A framework of cooperative federalism exists under the CWA,
giving states the option of allowing the federal government to regulate the waters located within the states' boundaries pursuant to
the standards set forth by the EPA, or choosing to self-regulate,
subject to federal approval. 31 5 Most states have chosen to self-regulate and, "in addition to setting water quality standards as required by the CWA, have availed themselves of the opportunity to
administer their own NPDES programs." 3 16 This system of cooperative federalism allows the EPA-approved and self-regulating
states to set water quality standards that meet or exceed the fed3 17
eral standards.
In 1987, the CWA was amended to treat certain Indian tribes
as states, or give them TAS status.3 1 8 To receive TAS status
under the CWA, an Indian tribe must prove it is
federally recognized, has a government that exercises substantial
governmental powers, is reasonably capable of carrying out the program for which it seeks TAS, and the functions that it will exercise
pertain to water resources held by the tribe, held by the United
States in trust for the tribe or its members,
or "otherwise within the
3 19
borders of an Indian reservation."

When TAS status is conferred upon a tribe, it will have (as "treatment as states" suggests) the "same regulatory opportunities as a
state under the CWA."3 20 Like states, Indian tribes with TAS status have the ability to set water quality standards that exceed
those mandated by the federal government. One commentator
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture." (emphasis added)).
312. Drucker, supra n. 260, at 327 (quoting Browner, 97 F.3d at 419 n. 4).
313. Id. (quoting Browner, 97 F.3d at 419).
314. Id. at 328.
315. Id. at 340 (noting that "all but six states have EPA approved NPDES programs").
316. Id.

317. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006).
318. Id. at § 1377(e).
319. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 784 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)).
320. Drucker, supra n. 260, at 341.
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notes that "[i]t is generally recognized that not only do Indian
tribes commonly adopt water quality standards requiring more
stringent effluent limitations than federally required, but also
tribal water quality standards are usually more restrictive than
321
even the state standards in which the reservations are located."
The magnitude of a tribe's ability to set water quality standards
cannot be understated. For example, "a downstream TAS tribe's
bar upstream activity subwater quality standards may, in effect,
32 2
permits."
or
licenses
federal
to
ject
An Indian tribe's TAS status under the CWA should not be
understood as an alternative to meeting Montana's second exception discussed above. Satisfying Montana's second exception is a
necessary component, and probably outcome-determinative, for
tribes seeking environmental protection and regulatory authority
under the CWA. The EPA has determined that a tribe must "have
inherent authority over the waters it desire[s] to regulate" in order to receive TAS status under the CWA. 3 2 3 The EPA has incorporated Montana's second exception into this determination. A
tribe's satisfaction of Montana's second exception will demonstrate its inherent authority over the waters. A tribe's inherent
sovereignty "is particularly relevant to the protection and enhancement of the natural resources on which many tribes depend
for economic subsistence and cultural continuity. Water is perhaps the most fundamental of such resources. '3 24 In fact, the EPA
presumes that pollutants entering its water supply will have a serious and substantial impact on the health and welfare of the
tribe, and the tribe, therefore, "possess[es] the authority to regulate activities affecting water quality on the reservation." 325 This
321. Id. at 342.
322. Id. at 343.
323. Id. at 355.
324. Id. at 349-50 (quoting Edmund J. Goodman, Indian Tribal Sovereignty and Water
Resources: Watersheds, Ecosystems, and Tribal Co-Management, 20 J. Land, Resources, &
Envtl. L. 185, 191-92 (2000)).
325. Id. at 356. The EPA's reasons for this presumption are found in the EPA's generalized findings regarding the relationship of water quality to tribal health and welfare:
(1) the Agency has special expertise in recognizing that clean water ... is absolutely crucial to the survival of many Indian reservations; (2) the enactment of
CWA itself constitutes a legislative finding that activities which affect water quality may have serious and substantial impacts; (3) the mobile nature of pollutants
may cause serious and substantial impacts even if they do not originate on Indian
owned lands; (4) Congress expressed a preference for tribal regulation of reservation water quality; and (5) water quality management protects public health and
safety, and therefore, is critical to self-government.
Id. (internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted).
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presumption allows a tribe seeking TAS status to satisfy Montana's second exception rather easily.
While it is believed that "any opposition by a state to the
grant of TAS status is futile," 3 26 a recent Oklahoma legislative
rider drastically limited the ability of tribes in Oklahoma to gain
TAS status from the EPA. 3 2 7 Due to this rider, Oklahoma tribes
must now get approval from the state if they want to "administer
their own environmental regulation programs." 328 The rider "requires tribes to obtain a 'cooperative agreement' with the state
before administering water or air quality programs. '32 9 Notably,
no other state requires tribes to obtain a cooperative agreement
before gaining TAS status. 330 The CWA provides that "an Indian
tribe and the State or States in which the lands of such tribe are
located may enter into a cooperative agreement, subject to the review and approval of the [EPA], to jointly plan and administer the
requirements [of the CWAI."331 Whether Oklahoma can unilaterally require tribes located in the state to obtain cooperative agreements is beyond the scope of this article. It is clear, however, that
once tribes obtain TAS status under the CWA, the "water quality
standards set by tribes for waters within their reservation boundaries will have impacts on water use outside reservation boundaries."332

3.

Court Treatment: Tribes' Jurisdictionover Their Waters

For tribes and their reservations, water is likely to be the
most fundamental natural resource. 3 33 Since water systems often
cross political boundaries, many jurisdictional questions arise,
and "tribal authority over rivers and other transboundary waterways [has been] and remains one of the most hotly contested areas."3 3 4 Emerging from the flames of this fire is the important
326. Id. at 393.
327. Indianz.Com, Bill Limits Treatment as State for Oklahoma Tribes (Aug. 1, 2005),
http://www.indianz.comNews/2005/009569.asp [hereinafter Bill Limits TAS for Tribes]
(explaining the rider was "tucked into [a] $286.5 billion highway transportation bill that
passed the House and Senate").
328. Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient TransportationEquity Act, Pub. L. No. 109-59,
§ 10211 (2005) [hereinafter SAFETEA]; Bill Limits TAS for Tribes, supra n. 327.
329. SAFETEA, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 10211; Bill Limits TAS for Tribes, supra n. 327.
330. Bill Limits TAS for Tribes, supra n. 327.
331. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
332. Goodman, supra n. 324, at 213.
333. Id. at 192.
334. Id. at 185-86.
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concept that when a tribe's "sovereign authority is exercised to
protect the health and welfare of Indian people and the natural
resources upon which such health and welfare depends . . . [that
authority] is not strictly circumscribed by traditional notions of
sovereign territoriality."3 35 A non-Indian entity whose off-reservation activities threaten or directly impair a tribe's water supply
will undoubtedly trigger Montana's second exception, the "direct
effects" test, which in turn grants the tribe civil jurisdiction over
that entity.
The importance of the "direct effects" test is made further evident when a tribe submits the required application to obtain TAS
status under the CWA. For instance, a showing by the tribe that
Montana's second exception is satisfied is inherent in the EPA's
analysis of the application. The EPA presumes that Montana's
3 36
second exception will apply to a tribe protecting its waters.
Once TAS status is established, there is no doubt as to a tribe's
civil jurisdiction over entities polluting its waters due to the regulatory powers CWA confers upon the tribe. When jurisdiction is
challenged, tribes that have obtained TAS status will have a
stronger position than tribes that have not obtained TAS status,
because obtaining that status includes a determination that Montana's second exception has been satisfied. The three cases below
demonstrate the importance of TAS status to tribes protecting
their waters.
First, in City of Albuquerque v. Browner,3 37 Albuquerque
challenged the EPA's approval of the Isleta Pueblo tribe's water
quality standards that were not only more stringent than the federal mandates, but more stringent than the standards set by the
State of New Mexico. 338 Albuquerque also argued that the tribe
did not have the authority to enforce its standards with regard to
"upstream point source dischargers outside of tribal boundaries." 3 39 The Isleta Pueblo tribe sits five miles downstream from
where Albuquerque dumps 55 million gallons of wastewater each
day. 3 40 The tribe had obtained TAS status under the CWA and
335. Id. at 186.
336. Supra n. 325 and accompanying text.
337. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996).
338. Id. at 421.
339. Id. at 423.
340. Id. at 419; Jason Lenderman, A Tiny Tribe Wins Big on Clean Water, High Country
News (Feb. 2, 1998) (available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.URLRemapper?date=/
1998/febO2/dir/Western A tiny_tri.html).
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adopted water quality standards to protect its waters. 3 4 1 The
court upheld the EPA's approval of the Isleta Pueblo water quality
standards, holding that "tribes may establish water quality standards that are more stringent than those imposed by the federal
government."' 34 2 The court supported the EPA's interpretation
and application of the TAS provision under the CWA "because it is
in accord with powers inherent in Indian tribal sovereignty."3 4 3
Furthermore, in addressing whether the tribe could enforce its
water quality standards against upstream point source dischargers, the court held that "tribes are not applying or enforcing their
water quality standards beyond reservation boundaries."' 34 4 The
court noted instead that the CWA is a "comprehensive regulatory
scheme" and the "EPA has the authority to require upstream
NPDES dischargers... to comply with downstream tribal standards."

34 5

Second, in Montana v. EPA,3 46 the court upheld the EPA's approval and implementation of water quality standards adopted by
two tribes located on the Flathead Indian Reservation in Montana. 34 7 In the tribes' application for TAS status, "the Tribes identified several facilities on fee lands within the Reservation that
have the potential to impair water quality and beneficial uses of
tribal waters . . .includ[ing] feedlots, dairies, mine tailings, auto
wrecking yards and dumps, construction activities and landfills."348 The tribes also identified "[o]ther actual or potential
point sources includ[ing] wastewater treatment facilities, commercial fish ponds and hatcheries, slaughterhouses,hydroelectric
facilities and wood processing plants." 349 The State of Montana,
along with private individuals owning land within the reservation, argued that the "EPA got the scope of inherent authority
wrong, and that the Tribes should be able to engage in nonconsensual regulation of non-tribal entities only when all state or federal
remedies to alleviate threats to the welfare of the tribe have been
exhausted and have proved fruitless." 3 50 The court rejected this
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

City of Albuquerque, 97 F.3d at 419.
Id. at 423.
Id.
Id. at 424.
Id.
Mont. v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1139-40 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1140 (emphasis added).
Id.
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argument and upheld the EPA's determination that "activities of
the non-members posed such serious and substantial threats 35to1
Tribal health and welfare that Tribal regulation was essential."
Relying on a former Ninth Circuit opinion, the court reasoned that
"threats to water rights may invoke inherent tribal authority over
3 52
non-Indians."
Third, and most applicable to the scenario posed by this article, Wisconsin v. EPA35 3 stands for the proposition that a tribe's
power to regulate water quality on the reservation is proper even
if it means extending that authority to off-reservation activities. 35 4 In Wisconsin, the State of Wisconsin argued that the tribe
355
had no inherent authority over off-reservation activities.
Under the CWA, "the EPA requires tribes to show that they already possessed inherent authority over the activities undoubtedly affected by the water regulations."' 35 6 Tribes may prove their
inherent authority upon a showing that the impacted water of the
reservation affects " 'the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe.' "357 This regulatory language, of course, directly follows the language espoused by the Su355
preme Court when establishing Montana's second exception.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted in Wisconsin that a tribe's
authority attaches because " 'water quality management serves
the purpose- of protecting public health and safety, which is a core
governmental function, whose exercise is critical to self-government.' ,39 The court in Wisconsin found that when a tribe obtains
TAS status, "it has the power to require upstream off-reservation
dischargers, conducting activities that may be economically valuable to the state ... to make sure that their activities do not result
360
in contamination of the downstream on-reservation waters."
The court recognized that this may impose higher costs on the up351. Id. at 1141.
352. Id. (citing Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir. 1981)
("A tribe retains the inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of nonIndians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the health and welfare of the tribe. This includes conduct that involves the tribe's
water rights.")).
353. Wis. v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001).
354. Id. at 750.
355. Id. at 748.
356. Id.
357. Id. (quoting 56 Fed. Reg. 64876, 64877 (Dec. 12, 1991)).
358. Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
359. Wis., 266 F.3d at 748 (quoting 56 Fed. Reg. 64879 (Dec. 12, 1991)).
360. Id.
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stream dischargers, and may even require the activities to cease
altogether. 36 1 The court posed a hypothetical situation involving a
transboundary water dispute between the State of Wisconsin and
the downstream regulator, the State of Illinois. 3 62 In that situation, the court noted that "the need for the two states to coordinate
their standards, or for the upstream company to comply with the
more stringent rules, would be clear. '3 6 3 Once a tribe has TAS
status, it has the same right afforded to other states "to object to
permits issued for upstream off-reservation activities. ' 3 64 The
court upheld the EPA's determination "that, since the Supreme
Court has held that a tribe has inherent authority over activities
having a serious effect on the health of the tribe, this authority is
not defeated even if it exerts some regulatory force on off-reservation activities. '36 5 Because the EPA has a supervisory role, "[t]he
tribe cannot impose any water quality standards or take any ac36 6
tion that goes beyond the federal statute or the EPA's power."
Finding that the EPA acted properly under the CWA and Montana
jurisprudence in allowing "the tribe to regulate water quality on
the reservation, even though that power entails some authority
over off-reservation activities," the court concluded with this remark:
Since a state has the power to require upstream states to comply
with its water quality standards, to interpret the statutes to deny
that power to the tribes because of some kind of formal view of authority or sovereignty would treat the tribes as second-class citizens. Nothing in 7§ 1377(e) indicates that Congress authorized any
36
such hierarchy.

C. Tribal, State, or Federal Court
If a tribe is seeking legal redress because its waters are being
polluted by a non-Indian entity whose activities occur outside the
boundaries of its reservation, where should the litigation occur?
The answer is not limited to any individual court system, but
spans all three: tribal, state, and federal court.
A tribe may certainly choose to litigate the matter in tribal
court. According to the Supreme Court, "a tribe's adjudicative ju361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Wis., 266 F.3d at 749.
Id.
Id. at 750.
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risdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction." 3 68 As previously discussed, impairment of a tribe's water supply directly affects the health or welfare of a tribe, triggering Montana's second
exception. Montana's second exception grants tribes civil jurisdiction to regulate the conduct that is threatening or directly affecting the health or welfare of the tribe. Furthermore, tribes that
have obtained TAS status under the CWA have an even stronger
position because the application process essentially requires that
tribes satisfy Montana's second exception before obtaining TAS
status. Once TAS status is obtained, the tribe has authority to
regulate the reservation's water quality, even if it imposes regulatory authority on upstream off-reservation entities, backed by federal approval.
Once in tribal court, the non-Indian defendant must, pursuant to the "exhaustion doctrine," exhaust all available tribal remedies. 3 69 In fact, "[e]ven when a federal court has jurisdiction over
a claim involving Indians, if the claim arises in Indian country,
the court generally will be required to stay its hand until the
plaintiff exhausts available tribal remedies." 370 This principle has
been extended by the Ninth Circuit to "diversity cases involving
Indian plaintiffs and non-Indian defendants." 37 1 The Ninth Cir368. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 483, 453 (1997). For a discussion on a tribe's
civil jurisdiction, including its legislative jurisdiction and adjudicative jurisdiction, consult
supra notes 269-285 and accompanying text.
369. See generally Melissa L. Koehn [Tatum], Civil Jurisdiction:The Boundaries between Federal and Tribal Courts, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 705 (1997) (providing a thorough treatment of the "exhaustion doctrine"). Professor Koehn [Tatum] offers the following propositions on the exhaustion doctrine:
1) a court may raise the issue of exhaustion sua sponte;
2) a court should not allow anyone other than the tribe to waive the exhaustion
requirement (this authority can, of course, be delegated to a tribally owned business or to certain tribal officials);
3) exhaustion should be required regardless of whether an action is concurrently
pending in tribal court;
4) exhaustion should be required whenever tribal authority is challenged, regardless of whether the challenge is to tribal judicial or legislative jurisdiction;
5) exhaustion should be required not only when a case "arises in" Indian Country,
but also whenever a tribe, a tribally-owned business, a tribal employee, or a
tribal member is a party to the litigation;
6) if none of the parties are Indian, then exhaustion is not appropriate unless the
defendant can make a colorable argument as to why the case satisfies the Montana test;
7) the "bad faith" and "patently violative" exceptions should be eliminated; and
8) exhaustion should be deemed futile only if no tribal forum exists.
Id. at 762-63.
370. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 630.
371. Id. (citing Wellman v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 815 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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cuit continues to require "exhaustion in all cases relating to tribal
affairs, including those that arise off-reservation and outside Indian country, even if no tribal court proceedings are pending, as
long as there is a colorable argument that the tribal court has jurisdiction over the case."3 7 2 Therefore, applying this principle to
the scenario posed by this article, the non-Indian defendants
would have to exhaust all tribal court remedies before taking the
matter to the federal or state courts. Moreover, most non-Indian
entities who find themselves subject to a tribe's higher water quality standards will challenge the authority of the tribe. When
tribal authority is challenged, whether legislative or adjudicative,
exhaustion of all tribal court remedies is required. 37 3 Those defendants would be obligated to do so even if diversity exists between the Indian plaintiff and the non-Indian defendants. On the
other hand, upon proper motion to the court, the Indian tribe
could opt to move the matter to another court system before all
tribal court remedies are exhausted.3 7 4
At first blush, it seems obvious that the federal court system
would have jurisdiction over any federal Indian issue. Federal
court jurisdiction, however, only exists if authority is granted
"both by constitutional requirements and by federal statute."3 75 A
determination of a tribe's water rights is a federal question, and
falls under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1331 grants the federal
court system jurisdiction over actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 376 As such, federal
question jurisdiction applies "because of the large number of federal laws and treaties concerning Indian matters."3 77 A tribe's
Winters rights certainly invoke a federal question because Winters
rights are not governed by state substantive law but "are creatures of federal law, which defines their extent." 3 78 Tribes that
have obtained TAS status under the CWA are granted regulatory
authority to regulate water quality through federal law. 37 9
372. Id. (citing Stock W. Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1992); Burlington N. BR. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1246 (9th Cir. 1991)).
373. Koehn, supra n. 369, at 762.
374. Id.
375. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 610.
376. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (emphasis added).
377. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 611.
378. Canby, supra n. 66, at 431.
379. Mont. v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)
(1986)).
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Furthermore, "28 U.S.C. § 1362 authorizes federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction over 'civil actions, brought by any Indian
tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior'if 'the matter in controversy arises under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.' "380 This statute "does not apply to actions brought against tribes or to actions
brought by individual tribal members." 38 1 Consequently, federal
jurisdiction will apply to a tribe who brings an action against offreservation entities whose conduct is polluting the tribe's water.
The trust relationship between the tribes and the federal government allows the United States to bring federal actions on behalf of tribes. 38 2 Interestingly, "the United States can properly invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on behalf of a
38 3 The United
tribe" when the tribe is unable to do so itself.
States becomes the holder of "the legal title to Winters rights as
is an indispensable party to
trustee for the tribes. It consequently
38 4
rights."
any adjudication of those
Despite the above reasons for federal court jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court has indicated that when the United States is a
party to any adjudication involving the determination of Winters
rights, the federal courts should abstain in favor of concurrent
comprehensive state proceedings. 38 5 In Colorado River Water
ConservationDistrict v. U.S.,386 the "Supreme Court held that the
McCarran Amendment rendered the United States, as trustee for
'38 7 This waiver
Indian water rights, subject to suit in state court.
of the United States' sovereign immunity only occurs "if a state
court water rights proceeding is a general inter sese water rights
380. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 613 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006)) (emphasis added).
381. Id. (emphasis omitted).
382. Id. at 615.
383. Id.
384. Canby, supra n. 66, at 441.
385. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 618.
386. Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800 (1976) [hereinafter Colo.
River].
387. Id. at 809 (interpreting the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666); Canby, supra
n. 66, at 442. Importantly, the McCarran Amendment only applies to the adjudication of
water rights, and will not cause an Indian tribe to pursue its water quality claims against
polluting entities in state court. Rather, as to litigation over the water quality, the tribal or
federal court systems are the only appropriate avenues. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (limiting consent for U.S. to be joined as a party to cases involving the adjudication or administration of
water rights); Canby, supra n. 66, at 442-45.
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adjudication of all claimants on the whole hydrologic system at
38 8
issue."
Despite the federal court's concurrent jurisdiction over the
water rights issue, the Supreme Court established "a policy preference that comprehensive water rights adjudication should take
place in state courts rather than federal courts." 38 9 Though technically silent as to federally reserved Indian water rights, the McCarran Amendment's sovereign immunity waiver has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as "extend[ing] to the
Indian tribes, providing consent to determine in state court federal reserved water rights held on behalf of Indians."390 For now,
future adjudications of Winters rights will occur in state court due
to the McCarran Amendment, but the "nature and extent of reserved Indian water rights remain matters of federal law." 39 1 In
other words, federal substantive law will govern these state adjudications. The assurance of federal substantive law governing the
issue does not comfort most tribes. In fact, "the prospect of state
adjudication of their water rights causes great apprehension on
the part of Indian tribes." 39 2 To protect against state court bias,
the Supreme Court in Colorado River stated "that it stands ready
to correct abuses in reserved water rights cases adjudicated in
state courts by exercising its certiorari jurisdiction." 39 3
Therefore, tribal and federal courts will have jurisdiction over
the adjudication of water quality issues, with deference to the exhaustion of all tribal court remedies before pursuing the matter in
federal court. The quantification of tribes' Winters rights, however, will be adjudicated in state court, but governed by federal
substantive law.
388. Carter, supra n. 215, at 379 (noting that "[tiribal [sovereign] immunity per se is not
waived by McCarran, but many Tribes see the value of affirmatively waiving immunity to
actively join in the defense of their aboriginal and reserved rights, rather than to leave it to
their trustee alone").
389. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 158 P.3d 377, 382-83 (Mont.
2007) (citing Colo.River, 424 U.S. at 813; Ariz. v. San CarlosApache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545,
572 (1983) ("Although adjudication of those rights in federal court instead might in the
abstract be practical, and even wise, it will be neither practical nor wise as long as it creates the possibility of duplicative litigation, tension and controversy between the federal
and state forums, hurried and pressured decisionmaking, and confusion over the disposition of property rights.")).
390. Id. at 381 (citing Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 809).
391. Canby, supra n. 66, at 443.
392. Id. (Most Indian tribes "believe that the state forum is likely to be unsympathetic to
Indian rights, and that the applicability of federal law does not provide great protection
against bias.").
393. Cohen et al., supra n. 76, at 1210 (referring to Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 812-13).
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D. Possible Objections to Tribal Jurisdiction
Using the State of Oklahoma's lawsuit against the poultry industry companies as an example, there are some objections the
defendants in the current poultry litigation would likely make if
sued by an Oklahoma tribe. Following the logic of Dawavendewa
v. Salt River Project,3 94 the defendants may argue that the Indian
tribe is an indispensable party to the state's current lawsuit in
3 95 The defederal court, requiring compulsory joinder of the tribe.
fendants could then further argue that, if the tribe does not waive
its sovereign immunity to join the lawsuit, the case should be dis39 6 In
missed because of the absence of an indispensable party.
Dawavendewa, an Indian brought suit in his individual capacity
against the Salt River Project for failure to preferentially hire
Navajos pursuant to Salt River Project's lease agreement with the
Navajo Nation. 3 97 The tribe was found to be a necessary party to
the lawsuit, but could not be joined due to its tribal sovereign immunity. 398 The Court further categorized the tribe as an indispensable party such that" 'in equity and good conscience' "the action
39 9 The determinashould be dismissed in the absence of the tribe.
tion of whether the court should dismiss the action because the
tribe was an indispensable party included the balancing of four
factors: "(1) the prejudice to any party or to the absent party; (2)
whether relief can be shaped to lessen prejudice; (3) whether an
adequate remedy, even if not complete, can be awarded without
the absent party; and (4) whether there exists an alternative fo40 0

rum."

Indian tribes located within the borders of Oklahoma would
not be indispensable parties to the State of Oklahoma's lawsuit
against the poultry industry companies. Unlike Dawavendewa,
there is nothing in the poultry litigation case binding the State of
Oklahoma to the interests of the tribes. It is the federal government, and not the individual states, that has a trust relationship
with the tribes. Furthermore, an adequate remedy can be
awarded to the State of Oklahoma without the tribe's presence in
the lawsuit, saving the specific damages sustained by the tribes
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project, 276 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1155-56
Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1161.
Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)).
Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1161-62.
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for another day. Since a state located downstream from
Oklahoma would not be required to join, it logically follows that
an Indian tribe would be afforded the same treatment. 40 1 An Indian tribe should have a separate but equal claim against the nonIndian entities whose conduct is polluting its waters. The Indian
tribes, on the other hand, could likely intervene in the lawsuit
under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 40 2 This
permissive intervention would not likely be pursued by the tribe,
however, because the tribe's interests in the water may be in conflict with those of the State of Oklahoma.
If the tribe attempts to seek legal redress against the same
poultry industry defendants after a final judgment has been issued in the State of Oklahoma's case, the defendants may raise
objections relating to claim preclusion (res judicata) or issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). While the essence of a judgment is
its finality, the defendants' claim preclusion objection would not
be successful. "A valid and final personal judgment is conclusive
between the parties"to the judgment. 40 3 Further, this only applies
to a final judgment of a matter actually litigated. Since the Indian tribe was not a party to the judgment, claim preclusion will
have no effect.
The defendants may assert, however, that issue preclusion
must affect nonparties in addition to parties involved in the lawsuit. For an issue to be precluded, the issue must have been "actually litigated," and the determination of the issue must have been
"essential to the final judgment." 40 4 A judgment may only bind a
nonparty if there is a special relationship, or "privity," between
the person to be bound and the party to the earlier action. No
privity exists between the State of Oklahoma and the tribe with
respect to the tribe's water supply. As such, an assertion of issue
preclusion will also fail.
Yet, in the tribe's hypothetical lawsuit against the polluting
defendants, a nonparty-the tribe-may invoke issue preclusion
401. See generallyArk. v. Okla., 503 U.S. 91, 94-95 (1992) (discussing whether the EPA
could require the State of Arkansas to comply with the higher water quality standards
imposed by the State of Oklahoma, though no mention of Indians or tribes exists anywhere
in the opinion).
402. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (providing "[u]pon timely application anyone may be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to
intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question
of law or fact in common").
403. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 17 (1982) (emphasis added).
404. Id. at § 17(3).
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against a party to an earlier action, unless the party lacked a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the original action. If
Oklahoma is successful in proving that the poultry companies
have polluted the waters flowing into Oklahoma, the Indian tribe
may be able to preclude that particular issue from being re-litigated.
V.

CONCLUSION

Water is undoubtedly our most vital natural resource. Today,
water is constantly being threatened by pollution and the expanding human population. Tribal reservations must do everything within their powers to protect this important but diminishing natural resource. In order to fully protect the tribe's water
supply, Indians must understand the intricacies of their federally
created reserved rights to water-otherwise known as their Winters rights-to obtain a sufficient quantity of water to fulfill the
purposes of the reservation. While an argument can be asserted
that Winters rights include a right to water quality, the importance of obtaining TAS status under the CWA cannot be understated as a superior means of protecting the quality of a reservation's water supply. Tribes without TAS can undoubtedly show
that any impairment to the tribe's water source will cause a serious and substantial effect on the health or welfare of the tribe.
This showing will trigger Montana's second exception which confers civil jurisdiction upon the tribes, even extending off-reservation over non-Indians. Obtaining TAS status, however, bolsters
this important jurisdictional power attributed to inherent tribal
sovereignty in that it allows tribes to regulate their water quality,
backed by federal approval and authority. While the United
States, through its trust relationship with Indian tribes, is morally and legally obligated to ensure that Indian water resources
are not squandered, Indian tribes should not sit on idle hands.
Indian tribes should actively assert their authority to protect the
waters they so desperately need and deserve.
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